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Abstract 
The unprecedented Arab Spring crisis that erupted in late 2010 and spread rapidly 
across the Middle East and North Africa is history in the making. As the Arab Spring 
progresses, it has become clear that some nations have been more successful than others 
in their responses to the crisis, although the reasoning for this is yet to be determined. 
This thesis suggests that Western foreign aid influenced the way in which these nations 
responded to the crisis, particularly in regards to their transition to a more legitimate 
democracy. More specifically, this thesis hypothesizes that those nations that received a 
significant amount of Western assistance responded more successfully than those that 
received little. The results gathered from the case study analysis conducted in the paper 
support this hypothesis. These findings reinforce the literature that argues that foreign aid 
is effective, and as such, open the door for further research into the ways in which 
Western foreign aid can be utilized in the future. 
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Introduction 
 
“There are very few moments in our lives where we have the privilege to witness history 
taking place. This is one of those moments. This is one of those times.” – President 
Obama, 11 February 20111 
An unprecedented movement starting in Tunisia and roaring across the Arab 
region, the Arab Spring is, in fact, history in the making. On December 17, 2010 in the 
small city of Sidi Bouzid, a young, unemployed Tunisian vegetable vendor, Mohamed 
Bouazizi, set himself on fire after police confiscated his wares and Tunisian authorities 
ignored his complaints of police brutality. What initially sparked an insurrection only in 
Tunisia, proved to be the catalyst for uprisings that, shortly thereafter, spread rapidly 
across the Arab world. Indeed, in a matter of weeks, Bouazizi’s “protest had sparked a 
full-blown people-power revolution that spread quickly throughout the Middle East.”2 
Moving first to Egypt and then to Jordan, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain, Morocco, and Syria, 
the Arab Spring has characterized events in the Middle East for the past two years. Some 
of these nations have been more successful than others in their response to the Arab 
Spring crisis, which leads to the question: why?  
 This paper will explore this question, with a particular emphasis on Western 
democracy aid and its relationship to the success of these nations in their responses to the 
crisis. Some of these Arab Spring countries, like Jordan and Egypt, have maintained a 
close relationship with the United States over the years and have enjoyed a significant 
amount of foreign aid from both the United States and other Western nations (such as 
Germany and France). Tunisia and Morocco have also received a fair amount of foreign 
                                                
1 Obama, Barack. "Remarks by the President on Egypt." The White House. N.p., 11 Feb. 2011. Web. 19 
Feb. 2013. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/11/remarks-president-egypt>. 
2 Tharoor, Ishaan. "The Arab Spring Blooms in Tunisia and Egypt." Time. Time, 07 Dec. 2011. Web. 03 
Oct. 2012. 
<http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2101344_2101368_2101659,00.html>. 
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aid from the West. At the same time, nations like Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, and Libya have 
not received much aid.  
Thus, the Arab Spring crisis lends itself well to exploring whether or not foreign 
aid – specifically democracy assistance -- is effective, a point that continues to be 
contested. Indeed, there is an abundance of literature that states that monetary foreign aid 
is ineffective and that the United States and other Western nations must establish a 
different system to help developing nations. Of course, there is also an abundance of 
literature that argues the opposite: that foreign aid is effective and can make a legitimate 
difference in a developing nation. This paper serves to add to this literature, illustrating 
that foreign aid can in fact be useful. 
 Broadly, I hypothesize that those nations that received a significant amount of 
Western foreign aid -- particularly aid that goes to the government and civil society sector 
– were more successful in their overall responses to the Arab Spring than those that 
received considerably less. More specifically, I hypothesize that Western democracy 
assistance can help lay the groundwork for a positive change, which includes a shift 
toward democracy. I use the eight Arab Spring nations mentioned above to examine the 
relationship between foreign assistance and the response of a country to the protests. I 
look broadly at foreign aid contributions over the past decade, but in addition to this, I 
also look specifically at Western democracy assistance (or aid directed specifically at the 
government and civil society sector). Based on the amount of democracy aid received by 
each nation and the overall results of the protests, I assess whether or not foreign 
assistance did indeed help shape the way in the various Arab nations responded to the 
Arab Spring crisis. 
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 My results are consistent with the original hypothesis. Those nations that received 
a significant amount of foreign and democracy aid responded much more successfully to 
the Arab Spring crisis, particularly in their transition to democracy. Those nations that 
received considerably less foreign and democracy aid were less successful, and many 
remain mired in conflict. These results are valuable because they call into question the 
research that argues that foreign aid is ineffective and instead, provide support for the 
argument that foreign aid is effective. While this is the case, the limitations of my 
research must be taken into account. Most importantly, I was unable to control for certain 
variables, which led to an unresolvable endogeneity issue.3 Therefore, it is necessary to 
keep this in mind while reading this paper. 
 It is important to recognize that despite much aid and pressure from the United 
States and other Western nations in the years leading up to the Arab Spring, none of the 
Arab regimes had made much progress towards democratization prior to the crisis. Of 
course, there were some steps taken toward democratization in nations such as Egypt, 
Tunisia, and Morocco, though they were somewhat uncertain and faltering when looked 
at with respect to U.S. democratization goals. Nevertheless, it is still possible that foreign 
aid – particularly democracy aid – did pay dividends in that it helped to shape the way 
regimes responded to the Arab Spring crisis. Indeed, it is conceivable that those nations 
that received the greatest amount of democracy assistance responded in the most 
successful fashion, where success is measured by Western democracy promotion goals.4 
This thesis will assess the extent to which this actually happened. Although the years of 
foreign aid aimed at democracy promotion did not do much to alter the makeup of the 
                                                
3 This endogeneity issue will be further addressed in the “Research Methods” section. 
4 See “Research Methods” section for a more detailed explanation of this variable. 
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regimes prior to the Arab Spring, perhaps they did influence the manner in which regimes 
responded to the crisis. 
 The paper will proceed as follows. I will provide the empirical and theoretical 
context for this research, explain my research method and hypothesis, provide a case 
study of each of the eight Arab Spring nations, discuss and summarize the results, and 
finally, provide an overall conclusion.
  5 
Theoretical and Empirical Context 
The effectiveness of foreign assistance (or foreign aid) has been a contested issue, 
especially as the political stakes have risen and more and more countries have started to 
give aid to developing countries. There is much literature surrounding the idea of foreign 
aid, ranging from think tank reports to entire books exploring the subject. Generally, 
these articles and reports examine whether or not foreign aid is successful from a purely 
economic standpoint, but do not look in depth at how foreign aid may affect other aspects 
of a nation’s development. This paper, however, shifts the focus from an economic 
standpoint to a foreign policy standpoint, in which it is possible to begin to understand 
whether foreign assistance (and democracy promotion, in particular) is successful in 
helping nations positively develop. Indeed, most scholars define success as based purely 
on economic growth, while this paper defines success based on a number of things, 
including a move toward democracy, an improvement in human rights, and the 
involvement of the military, among other things. This paper, then, provides a new 
perspective on the effectiveness of foreign aid. 
There are pundits in both of the aid camps – there are many who believe that aid 
has been incredibly successful, but others who fail to see how aid has helped at all and 
instead argue that it has foundered completely. At the same time, it seems that no one 
scholar feels comfortable saying that aid should be eradicated, or that it will not or cannot 
work in the future if it is restructured. Thus, an abundance of literature arguing for the 
“reinvention of foreign aid” has appeared.1 Additionally, much of the current research 
focuses on whether or not foreign aid helps in the growth of developing economies, but 
                                                
1 Easterly, William. Reinventing Foreign Aid. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2008. Print. 
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does not focus on how aid might help specific sectors, or whether aid given to specific 
sectors, such as the governmental sector, may have a different effect than aid given to 
other sectors, such as transportation and infrastructure. That being said, along with 
looking at aid on the general level, this paper explores in more depth the foreign 
assistance given to a specific sector (in this case, the government and civil society sector) 
in order to understand whether or not aid directed at a more specific area influences the 
way a nation responds to an internal crisis (in this case, the Arab Spring.) 
 
Aid is Ineffective 
Much of the literature examined argues that aid is ineffective, though most do not 
argue that is ineffective because it is in principle, bad, but because the current way in 
which aid is allocated and received is mismanaged. Indeed, many scholars posit that the 
effectiveness of aid comes down to the internal composition of the recipient country, and 
that no matter what amount of aid a country receives, if the infrastructure is weak, the aid 
will fail and can often times make matters within the country worse.2  
Fredrik Erixon finds that aid has been ineffective and instead has perpetuated 
poverty and created corrupt countries dependent on foreign aid.3 His research focuses on 
African countries in particular, as they have received the vast majority of foreign aid over 
the past fifty years. He measures the effectiveness of aid by comparing GDP growth and 
amount of foreign aid given to the country, finding that there is little positive correlation, 
and sometimes a negative relationship, between aid given and GDP growth. This supports 
                                                
2 See Stephen Browne, 2006, William Easterly, 2006, Djankov, Montalvo, Reynal-Querol, 2006 Dollar and 
Burnside, 2000. 
3 Erixon, Fredrik. Aid and Development: Will It Work This Time? Islington: Hanway Print Centre, 2005.  
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his argument that “aid has generally failed to achieve its stated goals.”4 This argument, 
however, is completely based on the fundamental assumption that aid is meant only to 
increase economic development, and that no other positive effect has come about as a 
result of foreign aid. Similarly, Dambisa Moyo argues that the U.S. should abandon its 
aid program entirely as it is only exacerbating the poverty situation in Africa.5 Like 
Erixon, Moyo argues that many African countries have become overly reliant on aid from 
Western countries, which has hindered the possibility of growth. These countries become 
stuck in a cycle they cannot break free from – they rely on aid, the aid they receive goes 
to corrupt governments or to areas in which it cannot be appropriately used, and thus, 
they require more aid. Thus, Moyo proposes a way in which African countries can beat 
poverty without foreign assistance at all. 
In a relatively recent study published in the Cato Journal, Djankov, Montalvo, 
Reynal-Querol find that aid has a “negative impact on the democratic stance of 
developing countries, and on economic growth by reducing investment and increasing 
government consumption.”6 This study somewhat reconciles Erixon’s assumption that aid 
is meant to only increase economic development by taking it a step further and 
incorporating the effects aid has on democratization as well. Though it is only discussed 
briefly, the findings are important for the study. Djankov et al. find that governmental 
leaders that receive a “sudden windfall of resources” will often engage in rent-seeking 
behavior, manipulating the political and social environment to appropriate these 
resources and block the vast majority of citizens from engaging in any decision-making 
                                                
4 Ibid, p. 29. 
5 Moyo, Dambisa. Dead Aid: Why Aid Makes Things Worse and How There Is Another Way for Africa. 
London: Penguin, 2010.  
6 Djankov, Simon, Jose Montalvo, and Marta Reynal-Querol. "Does Foreign Aid Help?" Cato Journal 26.1 
(2006): 1-28, p. 2. 
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about the distribution of the resources.7 Thus, the aid resources can “damage the political 
institutions of the receiving country by reducing checks and balances in government and 
democratic rules.”8 Jacob Svensson also examines this macroeconomic failure, again 
positing that rent-seeking behavior reduces the positive effects aid might have. He uses 
game theory to analyze different potential outcomes, finding that an increase in 
government revenue does not necessarily lead to an increase in the provision of public 
goods, and further, that even the expectation of receiving future aid will reduce the 
likelihood of effective policies remaining in place for protracted periods of time.9 Peter 
Boone additionally examines the various effects of aid as a result of the existing political 
regime. Related to the two studies above, Boone finds that foreign aid increases 
consumption, but that this consumption does not benefit the poor in any way. He further 
finds that aid does not increase human development indicators, and that overall, aid only 
benefits those in elite positions.10 Again, the ruling party uses aid in an inefficient and 
inappropriate manner, using aid along with distortionary taxing to “to finance productive 
government spending and transfers to their political supporters.”11 
William Easterly devotes his book, The White Man’s Burden, to explaining “why 
the West’s efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good.” It is not so 
much that the West is not trying to help, but Easterly argues that the way in which the 
West has gone about it has been horribly misguided. The Planners – Easterly’s nickname 
                                                
7 Ibid. 
8 Djankov et al., 2006. 
9 Svensson, Jacob. "Foreign Aid and Rent Seeking." Journal of International Economics 51.2 (2000): 437-
61. ScienceDirect. Web. 18 Sept. 2012. 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022199699000148>. 
10 Boone, Peter. "Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid." European Economic Review 40.2 (1996): 
289-329. 
11 Ibid. 
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for the West and its traditionalist approach to foreign aid -- “announce good intentions 
but don’t motivate anyone to carry them out,” while the Searchers “find things that work 
and get some reward.”12 Planners believe they already know the solution to the problem, 
while Searchers are aware they do not have a ready answer and that the only way to 
discover a plausible solution is through trial and error. Searchers further believe that 
efforts to create lasting change can only be “homegrown.”13 Implementing outside 
solutions is a surefire way to fail. In a similar vein, Stephen Browne agrees that the way 
in which the United States has focused its aid recently has been “looking down the wrong 
alley” and that if any change is to come about, it must be from a fundamental 
reorientation of the way Western countries typically think about aid.14  
Specifically relevant to this research is Knack’s investigation into foreign aid and 
democratization. Using a multivariate analysis, Knack examines the impact foreign 
assistance might have on promoting democracy, and finds that there is no evidence 
correlating the two.15 Although this finding appears to contradict my research, this study 
was conducted nearly a decade ago and much has changed since then – especially in the 
Arab Spring region. This, along with other recent research (see Savun 2011, de Ree 2009, 
and Finkel 2007) pointing to the effectiveness of foreign aid on democratization, makes 
the topic worth investigating further. 
Before moving on, it is important to note that most experts do not feel that aid is 
fundamentally inappropriate, only that it needs much revision. Hence, these scholars 
believe that there is a possibility of aid being effective if a restructuring occurs. 
                                                
12 Easterly, 2008, p. 5-6. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Browne, Stephen. Aid and Influence: Do Donors Help or Hinder? London: Earthscan, 2006, p. 99. 
15 Knack, Stephen. "Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?" International Studies Quarterly 48.1 (2004): 
251-66.  
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Aid is Effective 
Although there is much literature arguing that aid is ineffective, there is also a 
sufficient amount arguing the opposite. There have been successes in the realm of foreign 
aid, which Cassen and Associates investigate in their 1994 study. Cassen et al describe 
their results regarding foreign aid as “broadly positive,” explaining that aid has 
contributed to raising food production in South Asia, has helped to foster educational 
programs Africa, and has taught countries ways in which they can invest in their 
infrastructure, among a host of other things.16 Cassen et al. studied seven recipient 
countries in depth, and came to the general conclusion that “the majority of aid is 
successful in terms of its own objectives.”17 In India, foreign aid helped spark the Green 
Revolution, which in turn boosted India’s agricultural production and thus, the economy 
more generally. In Malawi, foreign aid helped in terms of public investments and create 
new institutions. In the seven countries studied, aid had some kind of positive effect, 
whether it was project aid or program aid did not make much of a difference. Of course, 
even Cassen et al. recognize that aid is not perfect, and that it must be modified in certain 
areas to achieve its full potential.  
Jeffery Sachs, an adviser to the United Nations on the Millennium Development 
Goals has also found that aid has had a positive effect. He argues that many developing 
nations are stuck in a “poverty trap,” and that Western aid can help to pull them out of 
                                                
16 Cassen, Robert. Does Aid Work?: Report to an Intergovernmental Task Force. New 
York: Oxford UP, 1994, p. 224. 
17 Ibid. 
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it.18 Indeed, Sachs actually argues for an increase in Western aid, focused specifically on 
the United States, saying that if the U.S. could increase its foreign aid commitments to 
0.7 percent of its GNP, it could drastically help countries still stuck in this “poverty 
trap.”19 Besides this, the United States is contributing less than it should in order to 
“provide for national security,” which is one of the main interests of the United States.20 
Sachs, too, however, argues that aid needs to be fundamentally reformed. The current 
way aid is distributed, and further, the amount of aid distributed, is subpar.  
Specific types of aid are also more likely to be effective than others. For example, 
project aid is successful (again, economically successful) for the most part, especially in 
cases where the intended results are clearly stated in advance.21 In 2004, projects pursued 
by USAID were 84 percent successful, projects pursued by the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) were 85 percent successful, and projects pursued by 
the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) were 75 percent 
successful.22 Additionally, aid tends to have the most success when allocated to specific 
sectors – particularly transport, rural development, and financial sector projects.23 
Unfortunately, the results of this type of aid are not aggregated, and thus, it is difficult to 
come to an explicit conclusion about the overall contribution of project aid in the long 
term. Aid may achieve objectives in the short term, but it still remains to be seen whether 
aid is successful for a prolonged period of time.  
                                                
18 Sachs, Jeffrey, John W. McArthur, Guido Schmidt-Traub, Margaret Kruk, Chandrika Bahadur, Michael 
Faye, and Gordon McCord. "Ending Africa's Poverty Trap." Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity 2004.1 (2004): 117-240. Print. 
 
 
19 Sachs, Jeffery. The End of Poverty. New York: Penguin, 2005.  
20 Ibid., p. 1. 
21 Riddell, Roger. Does Foreign Aid Really Work? Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007, p. 180. 
22 Ibid., p. 181.  
23 Ibid., p. 182. 
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Burnside and Dollar find that aid has a positive impact when countries have good 
fiscal, monetary, and trade policies.24 However, when in the presence of poor policy, aid 
does not seem to have much effect. In this case, it is apparent that the driving factor is the 
policy, and not the abundance of aid, or the lack thereof. Additionally, Burnside and 
Dollar examine donor countries themselves, coming to the conclusion that much aid 
actually goes to countries with good policies to begin with, though the donor countries’ 
strategic interests often outweigh this reward to the point that it is unrecognizable. 
Indeed, the United States principally donates to countries in order to ensure national 
security and honor aid commitments, meaning that strategic concerns play a role in the 
allocation of foreign assistance.25  
Most important and most relevant to my argument here is Burcu Savun’s research 
regarding democracy aid and democratizing nations. Savun uses statistical analysis to 
show that nations that receive significant levels of democracy assistance are less prone to 
civil war and internal conflict than those that receive little to no democracy aid.26 She 
reasons that this is because democracy assistance can “strengthen newly established 
democratic institutions, bolster state legitimacy, and act as a “validation” of promises that 
the new government makes.”27 This reasoning lends much credence to my own research, 
as I also hypothesize that those nations that received democracy assistance responded 
more positively to the Arab Spring protests and were more successful in their transition to 
democracy. To frame this in terms of Savun’s research, Arab Spring nations that received 
                                                
24 Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar. "Aid, Policies, and Growth: Reply." American Economic Review 90 
(2000): 847-68.  
25 U.S. Congressional Research Service. Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy 
(R40213; February 10, 2011), by Curt Tarnoff and Marian Lawson. 
26 Savun, Burcu, and Daniel C. Tirone. "Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How Does 
Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?" American Journal of Political Science 55.22 (2011): 223-46. Print. 
27 Ibid, p. 237. 
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democracy aid were more likely to avoid conflict and less likely to engage in civil war 
than those that did not. Additionally, Savun’s research offers an explanation for why 
those nations that received a significant amount of Western democracy assistance 
responded less violently than those that received much less.  
Finkel et al.’s research also argues that democracy assistance is effective and thus, 
lends credence to my hypothesis. Like Savun, Finkel et al. use a multivariate analysis to 
assess the effectiveness of democracy assistance from 1990-2003, finding that “there are 
clear and consistent impacts of USAID democracy assistance on democratization in 
recipient countries.”28 Based on this research, then, we would expect to find that Arab 
Spring nations that received a significant amount of democracy assistance were positively 
impacted by this assistance and made larger strides toward democratization. Building 
upon this research, I set forth my hypotheses in the “Research Methods” section 
following this review.  
 
What Is Lacking? 
A vast majority of the research focuses on foreign aid in a general sense. This 
research, however, fails to look at specific types of assistance that fall under the 
‘development aid’ umbrella. Even those that do specify generally focus on idea of aid 
“promoting growth in poor countries and thereby lift[ing] people out of poverty,” which 
comes back to the incredibly broad definition of development aid.29 Indeed, development 
aid in the most general sense is aimed at promoting economic growth within developing 
nations; again, an incredibly extensive definition. Additionally, aside from Savun’s recent 
                                                
28 Finkel, Steven E., Aníbal Perez-Líñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson. "The Effects of U.S. Foreign 
Assistance on Democracy Building: 1990-2003." World Politics 59.3 (2007): 404-40. Print. 
29 See definition given later in the report, under ‘Variable Operationalization’ section. 
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research on democracy aid, not much has been explored in this specific area. Thus, this 
project intends to examine foreign aid on two different levels, both broadly and on the 
government and civil society level, in order to understand whether or not it can be 
reasonably inferred that foreign assistance contributed to a more positive or negative 
response to the protests associated with the Arab Spring.  
Furthermore, much of the research surrounding foreign assistance has focused 
specifically on Sub-Saharan Africa and large developing countries such as India and 
China (thought at this point, China has arguably emerged as a developed country). The 
Middle East is frequently left out of the foreign assistance equation, as the countries here 
are not considered as direly impoverished as those in Sub-Saharan Africa. At the same 
time, Western countries still contribute aid to a number of these nations. Hence, this 
study is an attempt to bring the Middle East back into the foreign assistance picture, 
particularly because the current unrest has drawn much attention back to the area. 
Finally, it is important to remember that it is difficult to analyze the ultimate 
effectiveness of aid without being able to account for other possible factors. Roger 
Riddell, in fact, says that the answer to the question “Does most aid work?” still cannot 
be answered because of the difficulty in tracing the effects of aid overall.30 This study, 
however, is not an attempt to make a general conclusion about foreign aid. It is intended 
to look at specific sectors and see if there is a correlation between Western democracy 
assistance and successful responses to the Arab Spring protests, which in turn, might 
provide insight into the debate on foreign aid but by no means will make a sweeping 
generalization.
                                                
30 Ridell, 2007, p. 254. See Roger Riddell Does Foreign Aid Work? for further explanation about the 
difficulties of making concrete conclusions based on incomplete aid data and information. 
  15 
Research Method 
In order to examine this topic in depth, I look at eight countries in the region that 
were affected by the Arab Spring crisis. In three of these nations – Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Libya – the regime was overturned and a new, democratic government was established. 
In two of these nations – Syria and Bahrain – the demonstrations led to violent clashes 
between protestors and pro-government forces, but the ruling regime has managed to 
retain its power.  In two of these nations – Jordan and Morocco – the regime remains in 
power but concessions have been made in an attempt to appease protestors. In one of 
these nations – Yemen – there has been a redistribution of power, but not a full-fledged 
regime change.  
Of these eight nations, four received a significant amount of Western assistance in 
the past decade. Significant, in this case, is defined as amounts exceeding $2.25 billion. 
However, I standardize this measure and also look at aid with respect to total GDP. Thus, 
significance is defined more accurately as nations that received a share of total foreign 
aid greater than 5 percent of GDP. This paper, however, also aims to look specifically at 
democracy assistance over the past decade and therefore, examining this measure is 
necessary. Significance, in the case of democracy assistance, is defined as nations that 
received a share of democracy assistance greater than 0.09 percent of total GDP. Four 
nations, then, received both total assistance and democracy assistance exceeding this 
amount (Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan), while four nations received assistance 
falling below this amount (Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain).  
  16 
These eight cases therefore provide some variation on both the dependent variable 
and the independent variable of interest, while acknowledging possible confounding 
factors such as population and previous relationships with the United States.  
 
Hypotheses 
Based on existing literature on the subject of foreign aid and democracy aid in particular 
(see Savun, 2011) I propose the following hypothesis: 
1a). Those nations that received a significant amount of Western democracy 
assistance in the decade leading up to the Arab Spring responded positively to the 
protestors and were more successful in their response to the Arab Spring crisis, 
particularly with regards to their transition to a new, more legitimate democracy. 
1b.) Those nations that did not receive a significant amount of Western democracy 
assistance in the decade leading up to the Arab Spring responded violently to the 
protests and were either less successful or not successful in their response to the Arab 
Spring crisis, particularly in their transition to a new, more legitimate democracy. 
Overall then, I hypothesize that Western democracy assistance helps lay the groundwork 
for this transition to democracy, and that those nations that received a good deal of aid in 
the decade leading up to the Arab Spring therefore responded more successfully to the 
crisis. 
Understanding whether or not Western assistance helped to lay the groundwork 
for a successful response to the Arab Spring crisis is helpful in order to make predictions 
as well as prescriptions regarding the future. For example, many scholars advocate a 
  17 
redistribution of aid, or a restructuring of the system altogether; however, if this 
hypothesis proves to be true, much of this literature will be called into question. 
 
Variable Operationalization 
The explanatory variable, in this case, is Western democracy assistance. The 
definition of this variable can vary widely because it can refer to any number of different 
things. For example, assistance coming from non-governmental organizations can be 
counted as foreign assistance. Furthermore, there are a number of Western countries that 
could be included or excluded from this definition. In this case, Western countries are 
defined as those that are members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee. 
These countries are as follows: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. Aid in this study is specifically defined as Official Development Aid, 
which “consists of flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by 
official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, 
each transaction of which meets the following criteria: (1) it is administered with the 
promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main 
objective, and (2) it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 
25 percent.”1 I also examine aid flows to the government and civil society sector. This 
covers democracy assistance.2  
                                                
1"Official Development Assistance – Definition and Coverage." Aid Statistics. Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, n.d. Web. 13 Nov. 2012. 
2 See Appendix 1 for these figures expressed in a table. 
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It is important to note that military aid is not included in the definition of Official 
Development Assistance. Additionally, not all aid is reported in OECD statistics and as 
such, it is necessary to keep in mind that aid to certain sectors, such as government and 
civil society, may be understated. Indeed, throughout this research, the OECD statistics 
were continuously updated, therefore changing aid figures regularly.3 
The dependent variable, in this case, is the response of regimes to the protests 
associated with the Arab Spring. This response is measured according to an index that 
runs from “successful to not successful” where success is measured by U.S. 
democratization goals. In order to measure the success of any given regime in terms of 
these goals, I break the dependent variable down into five different areas, these being:  
(1) Level of military involvement. This is measured primarily by whether or not 
the military or police force became involved in an effort to crackdown on 
protestors. 
(2) Death toll as a result of the protests, measured in the following way: A very 
bloody conflict indicates the death toll was in the double-digit thousands. A 
bloody conflict indicates that the death toll was in the single-digit thousands. A 
somewhat bloody conflict indicates that the death toll was in the low hundreds. A 
conflict characterized as not bloody indicates that the death toll was at or near 
zero.   
(3) Tangible results of the protests: Either the regime was overthrown and a new 
regime came to power or an authoritarian leader remains in power.  
                                                
3 I attempted to keep up with these statistical changes, and this paper should reflect these changes up until 
February 2013. 
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(4) Effort to create democratic systems, measured by whether or not democratic 
elections were held.  
(5) Improvement in human rights (based on standards set forth by Human Rights 
Watch). Improvement in the area of human rights is broken down further. I look 
specifically at freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, 
women’s rights, and refugee and migrant’s rights. An overall “improvement” in 
human rights is defined as a country improving in at least three of the five areas, 
if not more.  
At the end of each section, I assess the successfulness of the response, principally 
whether or not the nation was victorious in its attempted transition to democracy based on 
the above factors comprising the dependent variable.  
 
Limitations 
There are important caveats to keep in mind, however. The results of the study 
cannot be taken completely at face value because there are a number of factors that I was 
unable to control for. For example, the population of each country varied, and as such it 
is hard to say with complete certainty how the amount of aid contributed to a national 
response. Not only this, but homogeneity varied between countries, which might have 
influenced the national response overall. 
As I mentioned in the introduction, I was unable to account for endogeneity in 
this study. Indeed, it is entirely possible that it was not the Western assistance that helped 
a country respond favorably. Perhaps factors that caused a country to be a candidate for 
aid in the first place dictated the response of the regime instead. In future studies, it might 
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make sense to use statistical analysis as opposed to case study analysis in order to help 
control for confounding variables and account for endogeneity.  
Additionally, conditions continue to be volatile in these nations. On any given 
day, events occur in each of these nations that have the potential to affect the results 
presented here. Again, it is important to note that the results here are based solely on the 
responses of the various nations in the past two years. Related to this is the availability of 
information during the writing of this report. New information became available on an 
unpredictable basis. For example, during the writing of the sections on Morocco and 
Yemen, the 2013 Human Rights Report became available and I was able to use this 
recent information in these sections. During the writing of other sections, however, this 
same report was unavailable.
Finally, I did not process-trace the aid given to each nation. Therefore, it is not 
possible to see what groups the aid went to or what parts of the democratization process 
the aid assisted with specifically. This would have been beneficial to the research, as it 
would have broken democracy assistance down even further, offering a more detailed 
examination of what exactly the aid helped with. 
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Empirical Analysis and Results: Nations that Received a Significant 
Amount of Western Democracy Assistance 
 
TUNISIA 
 
Country Dynamics: Before & After the Arab Spring 
As mentioned in the introduction, the events that took place in the small city of 
Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia on December 17, 2010 proved to be the catalyst for the uprisings 
that, shortly thereafter, spread rapidly across the Arab world. However, before Mohamed 
Bouazizi immolated himself and revolution ignited across the nation, Tunisian citizens 
lived under a highly repressive government. President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali came to 
power via a bloodless coup in 1987, and since then, had won every election with no less 
than 94 percent of the Tunisian vote. Of course, the repressive techniques employed by 
the government and enforced by the police, ensured the continued success of Ben Ali, 
making it nearly impossible for candidates of other parties to run, and additionally, by 
restricting freedom of the press and assembly, ensured that negative commentary or 
critique of the government was suppressed. Additional human rights were also restricted 
and excessive police force used on a number of occasions. In terms of social policy, 
however, Tunisia, even prior to the Arab Spring, was considered very progressive.   
Resentment began to build, however, and Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation 
provided the necessary impetus for a full-fledged revolution. Spanning approximately 
one month (December 2010 – January 2011), the insurrection forced President Ben Ali to 
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flee the country and allowed for an interim government to be implemented, and 
eventually, elections to be held. Conditions in Tunisia, then, improved significantly. 
 
Foreign Aid Received 
Prior to the decisive events of December 17, 2010, Tunisia was not a focal point 
for Western aid activities. In the decade leading up to the Arab Spring, Tunisia received a 
total of $5 billion in aid, compared to Egypt’s $12.5 billion and Morocco’s $8.7 billion.1 
Expressed in terms of percentage of GDP, this aid allocation falls around 11 percent. 
Neither was Tunisia a focal point for democracy promotion efforts of Western 
countries in the Arab world. Indeed, in the years leading up to the Arab Spring, Tunisia 
received only a small fraction of Western aid aimed at the government and civil society 
sector, totaling approximately $50.3 million from 2002-2010 (around 0.1% of GDP).2 
Yet, this has increased quite dramatically since former Tunisian leader Zine el-Abidine 
Ben Ali fled the country in January 2011. The United States alone has signed a $100 
million cash transfer agreement with Tunisia in order to “provide fiscal relief to the 
Tunisian government” and aid the nation in its transition to democracy more generally.3 
The Obama Administration has also entered into a $30 million loan agreement, which 
will “support…Tunisia’s democratic transition and economic recovery.”4 According to 
reports released by the Department of State in July 2012, the United States has committed 
                                                
1 "OECD Statistics (GDP, Unemployment, Income, Population, Labour, Education, Trade, Finance, 
Prices,health,debt...)." OECD.StatExtracts. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, n.d. 
Web. 31 Jan. 2013. 
2 Ibid. 
3 "Clinton Signs $100 Million Cash Transfer Agreement with Tunisia." Embassy of the United States Tunis, 
Tunisia. Embassy of the United States, 17 May 2012. Web. 13 Nov. 2012. 
<http://tunisia.usembassy.gov/clinton-signs-100-million-cash-transfer-agreement-with-tunisia.html>. 
4"State Dept. on U.S. Government Assistance to Tunisia." IIP Digital | U.S. Department of State. U.S. 
Department of State, 27 July 2012. Web. 13 Nov. 2012. 
<http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2012/07/201207279778.html> 
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near $300 million in total to Tunisia’s new government thus far.5 France, despite its 
initial “bungled response” to Tunisia’s uprising, has committed approximately €350 
million ($460 million) for government projects related to unemployment, training, and 
good governance.6 As of March 2011, Spain has also offered €300 million ($415.8 
million) over a three year period (2011-2014) to Tunisia for democracy development 
purposes.7 Canada, on the other hand, has not increased its aid significantly.8 It is clear, 
then, that as a result of the revolution, more Western countries9 – though certainly not all 
-- have taken an interest in helping Tunisia transition to democracy.  
As mentioned earlier, compared to other countries such as Egypt, Tunisia has 
received a lesser amount of democracy aid. Over the same nine-year period examined 
(2002-2011), Egypt received $458.8 million, while Tunisia received, as outlined above, a 
mere $50.3 million devoted to the same sector.10 It is important to note, however, that 
Egypt is a considerably larger country that Tunisia, with eight times the population. Thus, 
it is entirely possible that $50.3 million dollars aided Tunisia to the same extent that 
$458.8 million aided Egypt. 
 
National Response 
1. Military Involvement and Death Toll 
                                                
5 Ibid. 
6 "Tunisia: France Gives Aid To Country." AllAfrica, 21 Apr. 2011. Web. 13 Nov. 2012. 
<http://allafrica.com/stories/201104211032.html>. 
7 "Spain Offers Financial Aid to Tunisia." Fox News Latino. Fox News, 2 Mar. 2011. Web. 13 Nov. 2012. 
<http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2011/03/02/spain-offers-financial-aid-tunisia/>. 
8 Neil, Peter. "Tunisia Cites Weak Ties with Canada for Lack of Direct Aid." www.canada.com. 27 May 
2011. Web. 13 Nov. 2012. <http://www.canada.com/news/Tunisia cites weak ties with Canada lack 
direct/4848539/story.html> 
9 DAC countries for the purposes of this study. 
10 “OECD Statistics,” 2013. 
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In Tunisia, the brunt of the governmental response was left to Tunisian police 
forces, while the army remained on the outside. Indeed, “the army had never played a 
political role in Tunisia and had been carefully kept out of power,” so this is 
unsurprising.11 President Ben Ali relied exclusively on his Presidential Guard as it was 
the only security force he trusted, and so the army itself was “marginalized” with “no 
interest related to the preservation of the regime.” Hence, the defection of the military on 
January 10 was not completely unfounded.12  
Although the military worked on the side of the young protestors, the police force 
did not. Indeed, the police force had been used throughout Ben Ali’s rule to emanate 
power in the form of repression and violence, so its role in the protests is not much of a 
departure. According to Amnesty International, the police force “displayed a blatant 
disregard for human life…and did not seek to minimize injuries,”13 illustrated by the 
murders of between 21 to 50 people in Kasserine and Tala between January 8 and 
January 10, 2011.14 To be sure, Ben Ali’s regime “relied on a huge repressive apparatus” 
and thus a “plethora of security forces” in order to keep possible dissenters in check.15 On 
a number of other occasions, police used excessive force to control protestors – in 
Bouziane on December 22, police open fired into the crowd of protestors, killing one and 
injuring others;16 on January 26, after Ben Ali had fled the country, police brutality 
                                                
11 "Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia’s Way.” International Crisis Group, 
28 April 2011. Web. 25 Aug. 2012. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/north-
africa/tunisia/106-popular-protests-in-north-africa-and-the-middle-east-iv-tunisias-way.aspx>. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Amnesty International, “La Tunisie en révolte: les violences de l’état pendant les manifestations anti-
gouvernementales”, February 2011 as quoted in International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North 
Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia’s Way.” 
14 Depending upon the source, the number ranges. Authorities say 21, hospital authorities say 50. 
15 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia’s Way,” p. 9. 
16 "Protester Dies in Tunisia Clash." Al Jazeera English. Al Jazeera, 25 Dec. 2010. Web. 06 Oct. 2012. 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/12/20101224235824708885.html>. 
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continued, in this by using tear gas to disperse protestors.17 These are only a sampling of 
the aggressive measures taken by police in an attempt to maintain control, yet even here it 
possible to see the negative manner in which police reacted to protestors and continued to 
react to protestors even after their leader had effectively resigned.  
According to Amnesty International, approximately 230 people were killed during the 
uprising, while another 700 were injured. Compared to Egypt, this death toll is fairly low, 
and further, when compared to countries such as Bahrain in Egypt, the death toll is 
miniscule. Hence, the response here might be seen as somewhat bloody.  
 
2. Tangible Results of Protests – Regimes & Elections 
Overall, Tunisia has been successful in achieving the desired aims of the protests. 
On January 14, Ben Ali and his family were forced to flee the country, taking up refuge 
in Saudi Arabia. Shortly thereafter, an interim government was formed, headed by 
Mohamed Ghannouchi. However, after a month without much visible change, protestors 
gathered on February 27 in Tunis to demand his resignation. He was allegedly too close 
to the previous regime for Tunisian citizens to feel comfortable with his leadership role, 
and so announced his resignation following the large-scale protests.18 Within hours, Beji 
Caid-Essebsi replaced Mr. Ghannouchi as the interim prime minister.  
Additionally, free and fair elections for the Constituent Assembly were 
implemented under Mr. Essebsi’s rule. On October 23, 2011, approximately 3.7 million 
Tunisian citizens flocked to polling stations to cast their votes, electing Moncef Marzouqi 
                                                
17 Rifai, Ryan. "Timeline: Tunisia's Uprising." Al Jazeera English. Al Jazeera, 23 Jan. 2011. Web. 06 Oct. 
2012. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/tunisia/2011/01/201114142223827361.html>. 
18 Moss, Paul. "Tunisian PM Mohammed Ghannouchi Resigns over Protests." BBC News. BBC, 27 Feb. 
2011. Web. 06 Oct. 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12591445>. 
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as President and Hamadi Jebali as Prime Minister. The two took their respective seats in 
December 2011. 
 
3. Human Rights  
From 2009 to 2011, there was a significant improvement in most areas of human 
rights in Tunisia. I examined the five factors explained in the “Research Methods” 
section (freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, detention and torture, women’s 
rights, and freedom of religion) and was able to conclude that there was an improvement 
in four of five areas associated with human rights, these being: freedom of expression, 
freedom of assembly, detention and torture, and freedom of religion. It is important to 
note here that though there was no improvement in the area of women’s rights, this is not 
necessarily a bad thing as Tunisia has had fairly liberal social policies.19  
In 2009, prior to the uprisings, Ben Ali headed a very repressive state. For 
example, freedom of expression was severely limited, if allowed at all. For the most part, 
political opponents, government critics, and human right’s advocates were harassed, 
intimidated, and physically abused by the state security apparatus. Further, Tunisia in 
2009 was cited as “one of the worst media environments in the Arab world,” in which 
Ben Ali only allowed political supporters and positive opinions to be broadcast, and 
blocked website media that was perceived as critical.20 In 2011, however, there was 
improvement in this area. Shortly after Ben Ali fled the country, the interim government 
“proclaimed freedom of information and expression as a foundational principle for the 
                                                
19 "Tunisia 2010." Freedom House - Freedom in the World. Freedom House, 2010. Web. 09 Oct. 2012. 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/tunisia>. 
20 Ibid. 
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country.”21 This government altered the press code, decriminalizing slandering of state 
institutions and “offending” the president.22  
Freedom of assembly and association was also limited in 2009. Although the 
constitution explicitly allowed for it, and further, international treaties that Tunisia signed 
in the past required it, Ben Ali’s regime impeded upon this freedom. For example, NGOs 
were legally prohibited from pursuing political objectives, and human rights groups were 
not allowed to register with the state.23 In 2011, this was reversed. Human rights groups 
and NGOs no longer had to register with the state, and thus, were allowed to operate on a 
fully legal basis.  
There was a small improvement in the area of detention and torture. In 2009, 
torture in police stations and prisons was routine. Additionally, prisoners were held 
incommunicado for extended periods of time, oftentimes long after they were supposed 
to be released. In 2011, security forces were still using excessive force to control 
protestors, but there were far fewer torture reports than in the past.24 Thus, there has been 
some improvement after the Arab Spring, though not a complete reversal of the torture 
and force characteristic of the Ben Ali regime. 
Freedom of religion has not been as large of a problem for Tunisia as it has been 
elsewhere in the Middle East. Though Islam is the state religion, under Ben Ali, minority 
religions, such as Christianity and Judaism, were largely allowed to practice without fear 
of being repressed.25 In the area of Islam, there has been a small improvement after Ben 
                                                
21 Ibid. 
22 "World Report 2012: Tunisia | Human Rights Watch." World Report 2012: Tunisia. Human Rights 
Watch, 2012. Web. 09 Oct. 2012. <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-tunisia>. 
23 "Tunisia 2012." Tunisia | Freedom in the World. Freedom House, 2012. Web. 09 Oct. 2012. 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/tunisia-0>. 
24 World Report 2012. 
25 “Tunisia 2010,” Freedom House. 
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Ali was ousted. In 2011, conservative Muslims were able to more freely express their 
religious beliefs without fear of state intervention.26 Therefore, a small improvement can 
be seen, though because freedom of religion was not a major problem to begin with, it is 
less significant than other improvements, like freedom of expression.  
Finally, though there was no improvement in the area of women’s rights, it is 
important to understand that Tunisia has long been recognized for its “progressive social 
policies” and that women’s rights have typically been granted to a much greater extent 
than in other Arab countries.27 Indeed, in 2008, Tunisia adopted the Optional Protocol to 
the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
and after Ben Ali fled, it continued to uphold women’s rights. 
Overall then, there was a large improvement in the area of human rights. In four 
out of the five categories, respect for human rights had increased and positive steps were 
taken in order to ensure the consistent maintenance of these rights.  
 
Conclusion 
On the whole, Tunisia was very responsive to the protests associated with the 
Arab Spring. The country that effectively set the Arab Spring in motion, it has also 
experienced the most success in terms of the general response. Military involvement was 
relatively low, and the army actually took the side of the demonstrators, leaving the 
police force to deal with the brunt of the protests. The uprising was somewhat bloody, 
though not nearly as bloody as in places such as Libya and Syria, and even Egypt. 
Additionally, Ben Ali’s regime was overthrown, a positive step for the people, and the 
                                                
26 “Tunisia 2012,” Freedom House. 
27 Ibid. 
  29 
interim government also organized free and fair elections, another positive step towards 
democracy. Finally, there was a large improvement in the area of human rights. Taken 
together, it is possible to conclude that Tunisia’s response to the protests was the best of 
all countries researched. Of course, it is necessary to understand that though the response 
to the protests has been largely positive, there are still areas in which the ultimate goals of 
the protestors have not been achieved. Indeed, many citizens are still awaiting some of 
the economic and social change they so courageously fought for in the uprising.28  
This positive response is consistent with the proposed hypothesis. It would seem 
from the above that Western democracy assistance can in fact lay the groundwork for a 
positive response, including a transition to a new democracy. Although nations such as 
Syria and Bahrain have not yet been looked at, they received a significantly smaller 
portion of Western aid and were less successful in their response to the protests. This 
then, would imply that Western assistance can indeed be beneficial in helping a country 
respond in a better way, thus helping them shift toward democracy.
                                                
28 Ryan, Yasmine. "Tunisia: The Uprising That Started It All - Al Jazeera Top 10 2011 - Al Jazeera 
English." Al Jazeera English, 27 Dec. 2011. Web. 06 Oct. 2012. 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/aljazeeratop102011/2011/12/20111226205027882603.html> 
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EGYPT
Egypt’s response to the protests has been similar to that of Tunisia. In fact, 
Egyptian citizens were inspired by the successful Tunisian protests and took to the streets 
to demand change. Although Egyptian citizens were displeased with the political system 
prior to this event, they were relatively apathetic. Tunisia, however, acted as a catalyst for 
revolution in Egypt, in addition to other nations in the region. Indeed, the Tunisian 
protests proved to Egyptian citizens that their own protests could be successful and thus, 
on January 25, 2011, a series of protests were launched in an effort to overthrow the 
political system.1 
 
Country Dynamics: Before & After the Arab Spring 
Prior to the Arab Spring, Egypt was mired in corruption and subject to decades of 
authoritarian rule. The Egyptian police bureaucracy encroached on all areas of public life, 
and citizens were subject to abuse by these security forces. Human rights were hardly 
respected and the National Democratic Party dominated the political system. Hosni 
Mubarak, who had been president for thirty years at the time of the Arab Spring, had 
managed to suppress all forms of political dissent, and ruled with a firm hand – 
employing security forces whenever necessary. Though discontent roiled under the 
surface for years, it was only after Tunisia’s explosive transition that Egyptian citizens 
felt comfortable stepping forward to demand change. 
On January 25, 2011, tens of thousands of Egyptian citizens flooded into Tahrir 
Square, a symbolic location in downtown Cairo. With the help of social media, within 
                                                
1 "Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (I): Egypt Victorious?" International Crisis Group, 
24 Feb. 2011. Web. 30 Sept. 2012. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/egypt-
syria-lebanon/egypt/101-popular-protest-in-north-africa-and-the-middle-east-i-egypt-victorious.aspx>. 
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three weeks, Egyptian citizens had managed to “challenge conventional chestnuts about 
Arab lethargy; transformed national politics; open up the political space to new actors; 
massively reinforce protests throughout the region; and call into question fundamental 
pillars of the Middle East.”2 To be sure, Mubarak stepped down and presidential elections 
were held, from which Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi emerged 
victorious. In addition to this, respect for human rights improved somewhat, and the 
military actually defected from Mubarak’s government in favor of arbitrating the conflict. 
Shortly after Morsi was sworn in, however, the military issued a “series of decrees 
seeking to undermine the presidency,” leaving activists wondering what the ultimate 
result of their protests would be.3 In August, however, Morsi forced retirement upon the 
defense minister, the army chief of staff, and other senior generals, comforting activists 
who believed the military was gaining too much power in the new democratic political 
system.4 Yet, on November 22, Morsi seemingly reversed this move when he “issued a 
decree granting himself broad powers beyond court review,” apparently in order to 
protect the constituent assembly from judicial dissolution.5 Most recently, the constituent 
assembly has proposed a new constitution that would reduce the powers that the president 
has held in the past, increase parliamentary power, and provide provisions that would 
help to foster respect for human rights. At the same time, the constitution would give the 
military generals a significant amount of power, which is vaguely reminiscent of the pre-
Arab Spring period. Although the constitution was ratified in December, analysts 
                                                
2 Ibid. 
3 “Egypt News -- Revolution and Aftermath." NYtimes.com. New York Times. Web. 31 Jan. 2013. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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describe it as “hasty and ill-defined,” and have expressed concern about the ideological 
issues it may cause in the future.6 
 
Foreign Aid Received 
A key ally of the United States, Egypt has been the second-largest recipient of 
U.S. aid for over 35 years, beginning in the 1970s with the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty that 
the United States helped facilitate. The decade leading up to the Arab Spring was no 
exception.  
Overall, USODA reports that in total, Egypt has received approximately $12.5 
billion from 2002 to 2011 (in terms of total GDP, aid can be expressed as 5.4%).7 This is 
approximately $7 billion more than Tunisia received, and approximately $4-6 million 
more than Morocco and Jordan received. When looked at per capita, however, it is 
actually less. The United States has been the largest contributor, giving approximately 
$6.8 billion over the last decade.8 France and Germany follow the United States as the 
second and third largest contributors, each giving approximately $1.7 billion in total aid.9 
Egypt is familiar with Western democracy assistance as well. Beginning in the 
1990s, the United States began to integrate democracy assistance into its traditional 
development assistance program for Egypt. Initially, democracy assistance accounted for 
$20 million annually, but has grown consistently, especially with the onset of the Arab 
                                                
6 Ibid. 
7 "OECD Statistics (GDP, Unemployment, Income, Population, Labour, Education, Trade, Finance, 
Prices,health,debt...)." OECD.StatExtracts. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, n.d. 
Web. 31 Jan. 2013. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
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Spring.10 That said, in the past decade, the government and civil society sector has 
received approximately $458.8 million over the past decade (0.15% of total GDP).11 The 
United States has also been the largest contributor to this sector, accounting for $298 
million of the inflow. Germany and the Netherlands are the second and third largest 
contributors to this sector, giving approximately $36 million and $24 million 
respectively.12 Other sectors, however, have received more aid. For example, the aid 
allocated to the economic infrastructure and services sector is about $3.1 billion, which is 
a considerably larger amount than that allocated to the government and civil society 
sector.13  
Most recently (2012), the United States has promised to “relieve $1 billion in 
Egypt’s debt as part of an American and international assistance package intended to 
bolster its transition to democracy.”14 The European Union also recently approved a $6.4 
billion aid package to aid the nation in its “path to development.”15 
National Response  
1. Military Involvement & Death Toll 
Egypt is a unique case in terms of the military. It was highly involved in the protests, 
yet not in the manner that most expected. Indeed, after hearing about the atrocities 
committed by the military in Libya (and now Syria) one would expect the same to occur 
                                                
10 Snider, Erin A., and David M. Faris. "The Arab Spring: U.S. Democracy Promotion in Egypt." Middle 
East Policy Council, 2013. Web. 28 Feb. 2013. <http://mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/arab-
spring-us-democracy-promotion-egypt?print>. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Myers, Steven Lee. "U.S. Is Near Pact To Cut $1 Billion From Egypt Debt." The New York Times. The 
New York Times, 04 Sept. 2012. Web. 15 Sept. 2012. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/world/middleeast/us-prepares-economic-aid-to-bolster-democracy-
in-egypt.html?_r=2>. 
15 "EU 'approves $6.4bn Egypt Financial Aid Package'" BBC News. BBC, 14 Nov. 2012. Web. 21 Jan. 
2013. 
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in Egypt as a result of the excessive military involvement. However, it played an 
“ambiguous role, purportedly standing with the people while at the same time being an 
integral part of the regime they were confronting.”16 It took on the unexpected role of 
arbitrator, as opposed to agent, of Mubarak’s regime.17 There have been reports of policy 
brutality and excessive force; however, making it difficult to ascertain how and to what 
extent the military was involved. For example, the International Crisis Group views the 
Egyptian military as a relatively calm and collected entity, while other newspapers report 
the Egyptian military police brutally beating young women and performing “virginity 
tests” on detainees. Human Rights Watch (henceforth HRW) and Amnesty International 
(henceforth AI) also report “torture at the hands of security forces” and “use of excessive 
force” when describing the military response to the January protests.18 At the same time, 
much of the criticism regarding human rights abuses and mistreatment of detainees has 
fallen on the State Security Investigations Service (SSI), which was disbanded in March 
2011, as opposed to the Egyptian military more generally. For example, HRW discusses 
SSI officials “disappearing” political dissidents and torturing detainees for weeks on 
end.19 Even so, AI expresses concern for the human rights abuses occurring under the 
interim ruling Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) after the Mubarak regime was 
overthrown.20 Either way, these conflicting reports make it difficult to fully ascertain 
what role the military played during the protests. It seems, however, that Egyptian 
citizens generally have a positive view of the military and its role in the nation. Indeed, 
                                                
16 International Crisis Group, 2011. 
17 Ibid. 
18 “Egypt,” Human Rights Watch, 2012. 
19 Ibid. 
20 "Broken Promises: Egypt's Military Rulers Erode Human Rights." Amnesty International, 2011. Web. 20 
Sept. 2012. <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE12/053/2011/en/47be269e-b67a-42f4-835b-
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three in four Egyptians believe the military has had a positive influence on the nation, and 
63 percent hold a positive image of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces -- the interim 
ruling party, which relinquished its power to President Morsi on June 30, 2012.21 
As a result of the Egyptian Revolution, 846 were killed, while various authorities 
injured another 6,000.22 Therefore, the conflict in Egypt can be characterized as 
somewhat bloody. Compared to other Middle Eastern countries experiencing protests, 
this number is relatively low, though not as low as it could be. For example, in Libya and 
Syria, over 30,000 people have been killed, while in places like Morocco and Jordan, the 
death toll remains in the single to low double-digits.  
 
2. Tangible Results of Protests – Regimes & Elections 
In the case of Egypt, the tangible results of the protests are very clear. The Mubarak 
regime was overthrown and a new one installed, though the SCAF ruled in the period 
between the overthrow of Mubarak and the swearing in of President Morsi. From a 
Western viewpoint, with its emphasis on democracy promotion, it would seem that a new 
regime, free from an authoritarian ruler, would be better. Indeed, it is what most 
Egyptians want. In 2011, 71 percent of Egyptians favored the installation of a democratic 
government and the most recent poll, taken in 2012, again shows that 67 percent of 
Egyptians desire a democratic regime.23  
                                                
21 "Egyptians Remain Optimistic, Embrace Democracy and Religion in Political Life."Pew Global Attitudes 
Project. Pew Research Center, 8 May 2012. Web. 26 Sept. 2012. 
<http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/05/08/egyptians-remain-optimistic-embrace-democracy-and-religion-in-
political-life/1/>. 
22 "Egypt Annual Report 2012." Amnesty International. Amnesty International, 2012. Web. 27 Sept. 2012. 
<http://amnesty.org/en/region/egypt/report-2012>. 
23 Pew Surveys, 2012. 
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 In addition to this, the overthrow of Mubarak prompted the implementation of 
free and fair elections. Although a presidential election was held in 2005, the results were 
rigged. Thus, the elections held on May 23, 2012, marked a historical departure from the 
previously authoritarian regime. Finally, a new constitution has been proposed by the 
constituent assembly – one which reduces the all-powerful presidential position, grants 
more power to parliament, and provides provisions that will help to bolster respect for 
human rights. The constitution was ratified in mid-December, although analysts fear that 
the hastiness with which it was written and then ratified will cause problems.24 
 
3. Human Rights  
From 2009 to 2011, there was not a large overall improvement in human rights in 
Egypt. I examined the same five factors set forth by Human Rights Watch to conclude 
whether or not an improvement could be discerned. In the case of Egypt, improvements 
were seen in only two of the six areas associated with human rights, these being freedom 
of expression and freedom of assembly. Even here, though, the improvements were not 
large.  
In 2009, prior to the Arab Spring, security forces within Egypt arrested bloggers 
and journalists who openly denounced current government policies or exposed human 
rights abuses.25 Many were held indefinitely or sent to prison. In 2011, after the 
resignation of Mubarak, some improvement can be seen in relation to freedom of 
expression. According to HRW, the media was able to report more freely on matters that 
                                                
24 NY Times, 2013. 
25 Human Rights Watch, 2010. 
  37 
excluded the military.26 Thus, there is still some restriction in the information the media 
is allowed to report, but not nearly as much as there had been prior to the resignation of 
Mubarak.  
 There was also an improvement in freedom of assembly. In 2009, security officers 
arrested peaceful protestors for no particular reason and held up both laws 84/2002, 
which “stifled legitimate NGO activities,” and 40/1977, which allowed the government to 
interfere in the activities of political parties “in the national interest.”27 In 2011, the 
SCAF amended law 40/1977, making it easier for political parties to form, something 
which, in previous years, had been somewhat difficult.28 However, the SCAF “made no 
move to amend the Associations Law (84/2002),” and thus, the improvement was only 
partial.29  
 In the other three areas examined – torture, women’s rights, and freedom of 
religion – there was no improvement seen. In fact, in the area of women’s rights, one 
could argue that there was actually a regression. In 2009, 64 percent of women suffered 
from unreported domestic abuse, and further, were caught in a legal environment in 
which they were unable to report abuse or mistreatment.30 At the same time, the 
government issued sexual harassment booklets to women throughout Egypt, showing 
some concern for the plight of women. In 2011, there seems to have been a step 
backward. Indeed, twenty women were arrested at a peaceful demonstration in Tahrir 
                                                
26 Human Rights Watch, 2012. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Human Rights Watch, 2010. 
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Square. These women were brutally beaten with sticks and hoses, subjected to electric 
shocks, and at least seven were forced to undergo “virginity tests.”31  
 No improvement can be seen in the area of detention and torture, either. In 2009, 
it was reported that police engaged in torture techniques and exhibited brutality both in 
police stations and at points of arrest.32 One particularly disturbing show of brutality 
occurred when the police attempted to arrest Fares Barakat. When he asked to see the 
arrest warrant, the police pushed the man off his fourth floor balcony, seriously injuring 
him.33 In 2011, the detention and torture continued. Security forces detained protestors 
(including children) and subjected them to physical abuse. Additionally, riot police used 
tear gas, rubber bullets, and pellet guns in order to break up protests, injuring at least 
1,114 people in the process.34 
 Finally, there was no improvement in the area of religious freedom. In 2009, 
Egyptian Christians clashed violently with Muslims. These clashes oftentimes resulted in 
serious injury and death. Baha’is experienced severe discrimination, in which Molotov 
cocktails and rocks were thrown at their homes. Sectarian violence continued in 2011, 
causing the death of at least forty-seven people.35  
 Though there was improvement in two areas of human rights, three areas 
remained unchanged or even regressed. Thus, it is possible to conclude that there was 
some improvement in the overall state of human rights, yet even those areas in which 
improvements were seen still experienced some level of restriction.  
                                                
31 Human Rights Watch, 2011. 
32 "Egypt: Human Rights in Arab Republic of Egypt." Egypt | Amnesty International. Amnesty 
International, 2010. Web. 26 Sept. 2012. <http://amnesty.org/en/region/egypt/report-2009>. 
33 Human Rights Watch, 2010. 
34 Human Rights Watch, 2012. 
35 Ibid. 
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Conclusion 
 Overall, the military was highly involved in the Arab Spring in Egypt, though it is 
uncertain whether or not this involvement was considered positive by the protestors. 
People were killed and injured during the protests, though not nearly as many as in places 
such as Syria or Libya. Additionally, Mubarak’s regime was overthrown and the SCAF 
ruled in the interim, something that most Egyptians viewed as a positive step toward a 
more legitimate democracy. Free and fair elections were held for the first time in 2012, 
during which President Morsi was elected and sworn into office. Finally, a new 
constitution drafted by the constituent assembly was ratified. Unfortunately, human rights 
did not improve substantially after the Arab Spring protests and is something the nation 
will continue to have to work on.  
 It is possible to conclude then, that Egypt’s response to the protests has been 
largely successful in comparison to other countries that received a significant portion of 
Western aid, and even more so when compared to those that received a minimal amount 
of Western aid. Tunisia was more successful than Egypt in that its death toll was lower, 
military involvement was lower, there was a large improvement in the area of human 
rights, and the regime was overthrown and elections were held. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis set forth early on: Tunisia actually received more aid per capita, and as such, 
its response was more successful than Egypt’s. At the same time, however, Egypt’s move 
toward democracy was more successful than both Morocco and Jordan – nations that also 
received democracy assistance, one of which received more aid per capita than Egypt. 
Indeed, in both nations, the regime remains in tact and elections have yet to be held. It is 
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important to note, however, that those citizens of Morocco and Jordan demanded a 
different type of change initially, and as such, it is hard to determine for certain whether 
or not Egypt was more successful overall.  
 More importantly, Egypt was more successful in its response to the Arab Spring 
crisis than nations that received little Western democracy assistance, especially with 
regards to its transition to democracy. Egypt received a significantly larger amount of aid 
than Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen, and its response was less violent and more 
democratic than those nations. This is consistent with the initial hypothesis: countries that 
received a greater amount of aid were more successful in their responses than those that 
did not.
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MOROCCO 
Morocco’s response to the February 20 Movement, Morocco’s own Arab Spring, 
somewhat resembles the movement taking place in Jordan, which will be discussed in 
more depth in the following section. Briefly, Morocco’s response has been imilar to 
Jordan’s in that Morocco’s King Mohamed VI responded to protestors’ demands, and the 
transition has been mostly peaceful. Many have taken to calling Morocco’s reaction to 
the Arab Spring the “third way,” in which reforms were implemented without violence. 
According to some sources, the reason that the Arab Spring in Morocco did not erupt as it 
did in other nations was due to a “fear of chaos, a prevalent security apparatus, and 
genuine respect for King Mohammed VI.”1 Of course, for many activists, the reforms that 
have been implemented thus far are unsatisfactory.2 At the same time, when judging the 
relative successfulness of the Arab Spring in Morocco, it should be taken into account 
that many protestors were not nearly as agitated as those in other nations and moreover, 
that the military was not used to control demonstrations.  
 
Country Dynamics: Before & After the Arab Spring 
Prior to 1999, under the rule of King Hassan II, Morocco was a repressive country 
with little tolerance for political dissidents or free speech. During this time, “numerous 
political opponents were arrested, tortured and killed, or simply disappeared.”3 After 
1999, however, when Hassan’s son Mohammed took the throne, Morocco became more 
                                                
1 "Morocco." Morocco News. New York Times, 10 Dec. 2012. Web. 10 Feb. 2013. 
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/morocco/index.html> 
2 Ibid. 
3 "Morocco." Morocco | Freedom in the World. Freedom House, Jan. 2012. Web. 10 Feb. 2013. 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/morocco>. 
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tolerant, beginning with the sacking of Driss Basri – the interior minister responsible for 
much of the repression under Hassan. In addition to this, Mohammed established the 
Equity and Reconciliation Commission, which dealt with human rights abuses that 
occurred pre-1999. Although King Mohammed ruled with more leniency, this 
governance was far from democratic. Thus, on February 20, 2011, spurred on by protests 
in Tunisia and Egypt, Moroccans took the streets to demand that the King’s power be 
diminished to a “natural size.”4 
These protests, which the King initially attempted to control, eventually led to a 
reform of the Constitution, in which the King “reduce[d] his own nearly absolute powers 
and create[d] a system in which the prime minister would be the leader of the party with 
the most seats in Parliament.”5 The reformed Constitution also established an 
independent judiciary. These changes, however, have not been adequate for all activists 
but so far little has been done to facilitate further change. 
 
Foreign Aid Received 
Morocco has long been a staunch ally of the United States and other Western 
countries. As such, it has received a significant amount of foreign assistance from 2002-
2011, totaling at approximately $8.7 billion, with near $1 million given in the past year 
(expressed in terms of GDP, this aid allocation falls around 8.7%).6 This is approximately 
                                                
4 Tremlett, Giles. "Morocco Protests Will Test Regime's Claims to Liberalism." The Guardian. Guardian 
News and Media, 18 Feb. 2011. Web. 10 Feb. 2013. 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/18/morocco-demonstrations-test-regime?INTCMP=SRCH>. 
5 Erlanger, Steven. "Morocco's King Proposes Limited Steps to Democracy." The New York Times. The 
New York Times, 18 June 2011. Web. 10 Feb. 2013. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/world/africa/18morocco.html?_r=4>. 
6 "OECD Statistics (GDP, Unemployment, Income, Population, Labour, Education, Trade, Finance, 
Prices,health,debt...)." OECD.StatExtracts. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, n.d. 
Web. 31 Jan. 2013. 
  43 
$2 billion more than Jordan received, and $4 billion less than Egypt received. Again, it is 
necessary to keep in mind that the population of Morocco is larger than Jordan but 
smaller than Egypt and as such, this aid may have affected Morocco differently. More 
specifically, Morocco has a population of 32,272,974, which is about 5 times larger than 
Jordan’s population, but is approximately a third of the size of Egypt’s population. 
Of the aid that Morocco received over the past decade, the United States has 
contributed approximately $464 million, while Germany and France have contributed 
twice and four times as much, respectively (Germany contributed $1.2 billion while 
France contributed $4.1 billion).7  
Importantly, the government and civil society sector received approximately $250 
million over the past decade, focused on good governance and democracy building (0.2% 
of total GDP).8 This is slightly more than what Egypt and Tunisia received (0.15 percent 
of GDP and 0.1 percent of GDP, respectively). The United States, in particular, has been 
a consistent donor – in total giving $58 million. France has also been consistent with its 
donations to this sector, giving approximately $25 million over the past decade. The 
economic services and infrastructure sector has received a significantly larger amount of 
aid, totaling $2.3 billion over the past decade.9 
Aid has not dramatically increased with the advent of the Arab Spring. Figures are 
not yet out for gross disbursements for 2012, but between 2010 and 2011, total aid only 
increased by $1 billion.10  
 
                                                
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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National Response 
1. Military Involvement and Death Toll 
The military has been minimally involved in the protests in Morocco. Although 
police forces have intervened on occasion, the Moroccan military has remained on the 
sidelines and the protests have been generally peaceful. Only one death has been reported 
as a result of police violence.11  
 
2. Regime Change and Elections 
Although the King remains in power, there has been at least some move toward a 
more democratic nation. Indeed, the constitutional reforms set forth by the King in 
response to the protests have been a positive step. The King stated that the “government 
would emerge through direct universal suffrage” and has promised that these reforms will 
“make Morocco a state that will distinguish itself by its democratic course.”12  
The new constitution reduces the King’s absolute power, and gives executive 
power to the government. It requires that the King choose the Prime Minister from the 
party that wins the majority in parliament, and the prime minister is dubbed the 
“president of the government.”13 The constitution allows the Prime Minister to appoint 
government officials and dissolve parliament.14 However, the Prime Minister must 
consult the King prior to dissolving parliament and gain his approval.  
                                                
11 "Morocco and Western Sahara." World Report 2012: Morocco and Western Sahara | Human Rights 
Watch. Human Rights Watch, Jan. 2012. Web. 10 Feb. 2013. <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-
2012/morocco-and-western-sahara>. 
12 Erlanger, 2011. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid. 
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Soon after the new constitution was adopted, early parliamentary elections were 
held to determine the parliamentary majority and choose the prime minister. The Justice 
and Development party won the majority, although voter turnout was estimated to be 
only about 45 percent.15  
Thus, the response from the ruling regime has been relatively positive. Instead of 
violently clamping down on protestors, the King, fearing mass protests as seen in other 
nearby nations, attempted to reform the constitution in a way that would satisfy activists. 
However, though these reforms have been a positive step and have been lauded by 
Western nations for “settling into a new democratic order,” many Moroccan citizens are 
still unsatisfied.16 
 
3. Human Rights 
I examined the same five aspects that constitute a foundation for human rights – 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, detention and torture, freedom of religion 
and women’s rights, and concluded that there has been no overall improvement in the 
area of human rights. In two of the categories examined – freedom of assembly and 
women’s rights – there was a small amount of progress, but not enough to warrant the 
judgment of a general improvement in human rights. Indeed, Morocco continues to 
struggle with these rights, especially in the area of freedom of expression.  
Freedom of expression has long been suppressed in Morocco. Under King Hassan 
II, there was extreme repression, particularly in regards to political dissenters. Though 
                                                
15 Silva, Daniel. "Morocco Votes in First Election since Arab Spring Reforms." Google News. AFP, 25 
Nov. 2011. Web. 10 Feb. 2013. <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hE-
FKFhq2xSW041cOc1M_UCROLTg?docId=CNG.3195cbd80a97dd93afba44f43f750f6f.21>. 
16 “Morocco,” New York Times, 2012. 
  46 
this repression lessened under King Mohammed VI, it has far from disappeared. In 2010, 
for example, the press was allowed to discuss both economic and social issues but was 
constrained in discussing anything about the king or his family.17 In 2012, this policy 
remained in place, as any critique of the King was seen as potential fuel for the 
protestors.18 In addition to this, broadcast media was and continues to be controlled by 
the state.  
In 2010, Moroccan citizens were free to form associations or labor unions and 
NGOs and the civil society are allowed to conduct business within the nation.19 In 2012, 
this freedom was expressly noted in the constitution. As such, freedom of association is 
more respected than in other Arab nations. Freedom of assembly is not well-respected, 
although technically protests are legal. Those protests associated with Moroccan policies 
in the Western Sahara were especially clamped down on in 2010. In 2011, and more 
recently in 2012, respect for freedom of assembly increased as police forces largely 
tolerated the protests.20 Hence, there was a small improvement from 2010 to 2012. 
There were reports of detention and torture in 2010. Those suspected of Islamic 
extremism or terrorism were detained in secret and often held incommunicado for 
extended periods of time, during which they were tortured to obtain information.21 In 
2012, this still occurred regularly, though detainees also included members of the 
                                                
17 "Morocco." Morocco | Freedom in the World. Freedom House, Jan. 2011. Web. 10 Feb. 2013. 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/morocco>. 
18 "Morocco and Western Sahara." World Report 2013: Morocco and Western Sahara. Human Rights 
Watch, 31 Jan. 2013. Web. 10 Feb. 2013. <http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-
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19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 "Morocco/Western Sahara." Annual Report 2011. Amnesty International, Jan. 2011. Web. 10 Feb. 2013. 
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February 20 Movement as well as popular rapper al-Hadeq.22 Additionally, there were 
reports of torture from inside Moroccan prisons, indicating a distinct lack of 
improvement in this area despite safeguards erected to end this.23 Thus, there was no 
improvement in this area. 
Although Morocco is a primarily Muslim nation, freedom of religion is generally 
respected. In the 2011 constitution, religious freedom was acknowledged, although in 
some cases the government limited this freedom.24 According to UNHCR, Morocco “did 
not demonstrate a trend towards either improvement or deterioration in respect for and 
protection of the right to religious freedom.”25 There is not yet information available on 
the level of religious freedom in 2012. Hence, it would appear that while there was no 
improvement in religious freedom, there also was not a decline. 
Finally, in 2010 women faced a great deal of discrimination at the societal level. 
Although the government has been more progressive in terms of gender equality, in 
practice, women are still discriminated against.26 With the constitutional reform in 2011, 
gender equality was specifically recognized; again, however, women continue to face 
discrimination in practice.27 Thus, there was at least somewhat of an improvement in 
respect for women’s rights. 
Overall then, there was almost no improvement in overall respect for human 
rights. There were small steps taken in the areas of freedom of assembly and women’s 
                                                
22 "Morocco and Western Sahara,” Human Rights Watch, 2013. 
23 Ibid. 
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25 Ibid. 
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rights, though nothing monumental that would legitimately constitute an increase in 
overall respect for rights. 
 
Conclusion 
It is important to remember that Moroccans initially demanded reform different 
than those reforms demanded in Egypt and Tunisia. In those nations, protestors 
demanded aggressive change including the establishment of a democracy, while 
protestors in Morocco demanded a pro-democratic change, but not a complete upheaval 
of the current system. Morocco can be more closely compared to Jordan in that change 
has been more gradual, but the nation has still taken steps in a positive direction.  
It is possible to conclude that, at the time of this writing, the national response to 
the protests was somewhat successful. Although the regime was not overthrown, it was 
significantly altered and the King’s power was reduced. Elections were held to elect a 
parliament from which the prime minister would be chosen, a positive step. There was 
also little violence associated with the protests, unlike almost every other nation 
examined. The King also listened to the protestors and eventually attempted to appease 
them by implementing constitutional reforms. Although there was not any improvement 
in human rights, this is overshadowed by the relatively peaceful manner in which reforms 
were achieved. It might be concluded then, that in terms of legitimate regime change, 
Tunisia and Egypt were more successful, but that in terms of military involvement and 
death toll, Morocco was more successful. In all areas, it is difficult to say whether or not 
one country was more successful than the other. It can be concluded, however, that 
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Morocco was at least more successful than those nations that received only a small 
amount of Western assistance (Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria.) 
Morocco’s response is consistent with the proposed hypothesis: that Western 
democracy aid can lay the groundwork for a positive response, which includes a 
transition to democracy. Morocco received some Western democracy aid and as such, 
was able to take steps toward creating a parliamentary monarchy. As it received more aid 
than Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain, it might be possible to surmise that due to this 
aid, its response was more successful. 
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JORDAN 
Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, where protests led to the eventual ousting of corrupt 
leadership and ultimately, revolution, the protests in Jordan are of a different nature. 
Indeed, the protests in Jordan have not led to a revolution or a coup, in part because of the 
ethnic divide present in Jordan. The movement in Jordan can be more closely compared 
to that in Morocco, in which similar results have emerged. 
As opposed to large protests, like those in Tunisia and Egypt, the protests in 
Jordan have been small and limited. Further, not much change has come about as a result 
of the protests, likely because the protests have been small, even after the Arab uprising 
grew in Tunisia and Egypt.  
Small protests began to emerge in 2010, when public servants, teachers, and 
students began to protest in the hopes of improving labor conditions and acquiring more 
freedom to organize.1 In 2011, after uprisings began to occur in other Arab countries, the 
protests in Jordan also flared, though not to the same extent.  
There is not much to show for the protests. The government has made superficial 
concessions, such as replacing the Prime Minister, but besides that, no drastic alteration 
has been made. The king remains in power, free and fair elections have yet to be held, 
and human rights have not noticeably improved. Overall, then, the results of the protests 
thus far have been limited. At the same time, Jordan has been more successful than 
nations like Bahrain and Syria, both of which have astronomical death tolls stemming 
                                                
1 "Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (IX): Dallying with Reform in a Divided Jordan.” 
International Crisis Group, 12 March 2012. Web. 23 Oct. 2012. 
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from the demonstrations but little to show for them. It is worth noting, however, that the 
protests in Jordan are still in progress, and it could be that sometime in the future, Jordan 
experiences a revolution.  
 
Country Dynamics: Before & After the Arab Spring 
Jordan is a country with deep-seated divisions stemming from ethnic differences -
- one of the main reasons protests have been largely unsuccessful. The fissure between 
East Bankers, who believe that they are the rightful inhabitants of Jordan, and the 
Palestinian-Jordanians, has been exacerbated in recent years, particularly because 
economic conditions in Jordan remain poor.2  
East Bankers are typically rural dwellers that rely on agriculture to make a living. 
At the same time, East Bankers also dominate the public sector, shutting out Palestinian-
Jordanians from positions in Parliament or the government more generally.3 Historically, 
East Bankers have supported the government, for fear that the Palestinian-Jordanians, 
who are more numerous than East Bankers, will assume dominance.4  
Palestinian-Jordanians, on the other hand, typically hail from urban epicenters and 
work as private sector businessmen. Yet, the East Bankers have made them feel 
marginalized and shut-out, sometimes even treated as disloyal to the nation.5 East 
Bankers have also painted the Palestinian-Jordanians as “greedy capitalists,” and because 
                                                
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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of this, Palestinian-Jordanians have been hesitant about demonstrating for fear of a 
national backlash.6  
The government of Jordan has used this fissure to its advantage, pitting the two 
groups against each other as a means to retain power.7 Today, however, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult for the Jordanian government to play up this division because even 
the historically supportive East Bankers are becoming disgruntled. With the 1990 near 
collapse of the agricultural sector and recent limitations on public spending, their rural 
lifestyle has been threatened. As such, progressively more East Bankers are expressing 
their discontent.  
It is clear then, that both groups are “simultaneously angry,” though certainly not 
“united in anger,” which has made it easy for the government to remain in power.8  
In terms of civil liberties, freedom of assembly is restricted, and there are reports 
of torture and ill-treatment in prisons. Women have equal political rights, but do not 
receive the same rights in divorce or custody battles. Citizens are also allowed to freely 
practice the religion of their choice. 
 
Foreign Aid Received 
Jordan has received a considerable amount of foreign aid from Western countries 
over the past decade – just short of $7 billion in total (about 22% of total GDP).9 This is 
approximately $1 billion more than Tunisia received, $2 billion less than Morocco 
                                                
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Creditor Reporting System. OECD Stat.Extracts, 23 Oct. 2012. Web. 23 Oct. 2012. 
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received, and $5.5 billion less than Egypt received. However, Jordan also has a smaller 
population than all of these nations.  
The United States has been the largest contributor to Jordan, giving approximately 
$4.5 billion over the last decade. This is likely because Jordan is a strategic asset to the 
United States, particularly because of its location. It has cooperated with the United 
States on a number of issues, and has supported the U.S. in its process to secure Arab-
Israeli peace.10 
In terms of aid directed at the government and civil society sector over the past 
decade, Jordan has received more than Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco. Indeed, Jordan 
received a total of $779 million (1.7% of total GDP), while Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco 
received $50.3 million, $356.4 million, and $250 million respectively (0.1%, 0.15%, and 
0.2% expressed in terms of GDP).11 There was a huge increase in the contribution to this 
sector after small protests began in 2010, particularly from the United States. Indeed, in 
2010 Jordan received $196 million, and in 2011, it received $239 million from the United 
States.12 In 2011, the European Union also committed $3.9 billion in in the hopes of 
“enhanc[ing]…the economic, social and political atmosphere in the country.”13  
The economic infrastructure sector has received substantially less foreign 
assistance than the government and civil society sector -- $165 million over the past 
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Congressional Research Service, 3 Oct. 2012. Web. 10 Feb. 2013. 
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12 Ibid. 
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decade.14 The social services sector, on the other hand, received significantly more, 
totaling $2.7 billion over the past decade.15  
Aid continues to flow into Jordan as the protests continue, although statistics are 
not yet out for FY 2012.  
 
National Response 
1. Military Involvement & Death Toll 
Thus far, the military has been minimally involved in the protests. On a few 
occasions, there were reports that security forces became violent while trying to keep 
protestors in check, but on the whole, security forces have not been utilized.16 The death 
toll also remains low.  
 
2. Tangible Results of the Protests – Regimes & Elections 
The lack of military involvement is likely due to the fact that the Jordanian 
government has been at least somewhat accommodating to protestors demands. For 
example in 2011, when protestors, who had come to see Prime Minister Samir al-Rifai as 
the “nexus between business and political elites,” demanded that he be dismissed, King 
Abdullah II obliged, replacing Riafi with Marouf al-Bakhit in an attempt to pacify 
protestors.17 After Bakhit, too, came under attack, King Abdullah once again reshuffled 
the cabinet and replaced Bakhit with Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh.  
                                                
14 Creditor Reporting System, OECD Stats.Extracts. 
15 Ibid. 
16 "World Report 2013: Jordan | Human Rights Watch." World Report 2013: Jordan. Human Rights Watch, 
2013. Web. 31 March 2013. <http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/jordan> 
17 Popular Protest in Middle East & North Africa, p. 3. 
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Additionally, the government has created the National Dialogue Committee -- 
comprised of political elites, members of opposition parties, members from women’s and 
youth groups, and a variety of other people -- charged with the task of coming to an 
agreement on political reform, though many protestors see this attempt at reform 
superficial at best.18 Mr. Ahmad Sami, for example, believes that “the Parliament will not 
approve these recommendations [set forth by the NDC], because it’s not in their own 
personal interest.”  
  In April 2011, King Abullah also called a meeting to review the Constitution of 
Jordan, though opposition party members and ordinary citizens were excluded from the 
process. The review did produce amendments to the constitution, however. For example, 
a commission was created to oversee elections, the government’s ability to rule by decree 
was decreased, and a constitutional court was set up in order to narrow the scope of the 
State Security Court.19  
Though some changes have come about as a result of the protests, the regime remains 
in tact and free and fair elections have yet to be implemented. Of course, because 
Jordanian citizens desire gradual change, for fear of instability seizing the country, a 
radical regime change would be disastrous. Indeed, “Jordanians are asking for reform 
without changing the regime,” an outlook that is opposite that of Egyptians and 
Tunisians.20 They, do however, desire free and fair elections, which have not been 
implemented yet.  
 
                                                
18 Sweis, Rana F. "Jordan Tries to Remake Its Political Machinery." The New York Times. NYT.com, 09 
June 2011. Web. 23 Oct. 2012. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/world/middleeast/09iht-M09-
JORDAN.html>. 
19 Popular Protest in Middle East & North Africa, p. 4 
20 Ibid. 
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3. Human Rights 
There was no improvement in the area of human rights from 2009 to 2011. I 
examined the same five factors (freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, detention 
and torture, women’s rights, and freedom of religion) and concluded that there was only a 
small improvement in one area – freedom of assembly. On the whole, however, human 
rights remained the same. 
In 2009, free speech was restricted, and any critique of the king, government 
officials, or “comments deemed offensive to Islam” was punishable by arrest and 
possible imprisonment.21 Broadcasting stations were largely under state control, though 
citizens were allowed to watch foreign media as well. Newspapers and magazines were 
also controlled by the state.22 In 2011, there was no improvement in this area. Free speech 
continued to be restricted, and attacks against journalists actually increased.23 
Broadcasting stations remained under state control.  
There was a small improvement in freedom of assembly and association. In 2009, 
the government was allowed to intrude on activities of NGOs; NGOs had to request 
permission from the government to hold a meeting and further, had to allow government 
officials to sit-in on the meeting.24 Citizens also had to obtain permission from 
government officials to hold demonstrations. In 2011, however, the Public Gatherings 
                                                
21 "World Report 2010: Jordan | Human Rights Watch." World Report 2010: Jordan. Human Rights Watch, 
2012. Web. 23 Oct. 2012. <http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87725>. 
22 “Jordan 2010." Freedom House - Freedom in the World. Freedom House, 2010. Web. 23 Oct. 2012. 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/jordan>. 
23 “Jordan 2012." Freedom House - Freedom in the World. Freedom House, 2010. Web. 23 Oct. 2012. 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/jordan>. 
24 World Report 2010. 
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Law allowed meetings and demonstrations to be held without gaining permission from 
the government.25 
There was no improvement in the area of detention and torture. In 2009, there 
were reports of torture and ill-treatment and an estimated 13,000 people were held under 
the 1954 Law on Crime Prevention, which allowed citizens to be detained if they were 
suspected of committing a crime and further, to be held indefinitely without charge or 
trial.26 In 2011, there was no improvement in this area, although Interior Minister Mazin 
al-Sakit proposed changes to the Crime Prevention Law that would make it so a citizen 
could not be detained for longer than 15 days without charge.27 
There was also no improvement in the area of women’s rights. Though women 
have equal political rights as men, they face discrimination in custody battles or divorce 
cases.28 Additionally, “honor killings” continued into 2011 and the punishments for these 
killings remained lenient.29 
There was no improvement in freedom of religion, but this is not a bad thing. 
Though Islam is the state religion, Christianity is recognized as the minority religion and 
citizens are allowed to freely worship.30 Additional religions are also tolerated, and 
followers are allowed to practice openly.31 In 2011, this remained true. 
Looking at the five factors together then, there was no improvement in human 
rights overall. Though there was a small improvement in the area of freedom of 
                                                
25 "World Report 2012: Jordan | Human Rights Watch." World Report 2012: Jordan. Human Rights Watch, 
2012. Web. 23 Oct. 2012. <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-jordan>. 
26 "Jordan." Jordan - Amnesty International Report 2010 | Amnesty International. Amnesty International, 
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27 World Report 2012. 
28 Ibid. 
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30 Ibid. 
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assembly, it was too small to contribute to any improvement in the overall state of human 
rights. 
 
Conclusion 
On the whole, the Jordanian government was somewhat responsive to the 
protests. The government did take steps to appease demonstrators, although the protests 
did not result in a new regime or free and fair elections. Again, it is important to note that 
most Jordanians want gradual change, and so the fact that the regime was not overthrown 
is not necessarily a bad thing. There was almost no military involvement, though in some 
cases police forces used excessive force to control protestors. The uprising was not 
bloody at all, especially when compared to Libya, Bahrain, and Syria. Unfortunately, 
there was not any improvement in the area of human rights. 
Overall, Jordan’s response was consistent with the proposed hypothesis. Changes 
have in fact been made and there has been at least somewhat of a positive response, 
including a shift towards democracy, even if it was not as dramatic as in nations like 
Tunisia and Libya. Additionally, there was almost no violence and the death toll was 
almost non-existent. This alone makes it more successful than Libya. The fact that the 
death toll in Syria and Bahrain is so high and no change has been made also shows that 
Jordan has been more successful. Again, this makes sense given the hypothesis: those 
nations that received a significant amount of Western assistance were more successful in 
their responses, which included transitioning to democracy. Jordan received a significant 
amount of Western assistance and was at least somewhat successful in implementing 
reforms in the direction of democracy, while nations like Syria and Bahrain received little 
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Western assistance and have made almost no move in that direction. Therefore, the 
results illustrated in Jordan support the hypothesis.
  60 
Nations That Did Not Receive A Significant Amount of Western 
Assistance 
LIBYA 
Country Dynamics: Before & After the Arab Spring 
The protests that arose in Libya were dissimilar to the Arab Spring protests 
studied thus far. Indeed, the uprising in Libya took on a different quality than those in 
nations like Egypt and Tunisia because of the historical structure of the state. Prior to 
Muammar Gaddafi’s rise to power, Libya was a monarchy heavily backed by the British 
and ruled by King Idris. In 1969, however, Gaddafi and other officers staged a military 
coup, which many Libyans viewed as a positive step away from the West and toward 
Arab nationalism. Gaddafi immediately set about restructuring the state, creating the 
Jamahiriya or “state of the masses” to govern the nation. Although the Jamahiriya 
brought a new kind of order to the nation, it was incredibly repressive and was centered 
on Gaddafi’s desire to remain in power. Indeed, Gaddafi took steps to “eliminate all 
potential sources of resistance to his rule,” effectively prohibiting political parties and 
stripping religious institutions of their historic power and importance.1 Gaddafi’s 
emphasis on an anti-imperial ideology was also important in the early Libyan state. He 
viewed it as a force that could be used to increase his legitimacy and as such, “set about 
buttressing the [1969] revolution with an ideological discourse that would validate his 
                                                
1 “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V): Making Sense of Libya.” International Crisis 
Group, 6 June 2011. Web. 25 Aug. 2012. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-
africa/north-africa/libya/107-popular-protest-in-north-africa-and-the-middle-east-v-making-sense-of-
libya.aspx>, p. 6.  
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regime and disarm its critics.”2 For over forty years, Libyan citizens lived under the 
repressive system based on the Jamahiriya. Resentment was building under the surface, 
but it was not until the successful protests in Egypt and Tunisia that citizens took action. 
On February 15, 2011, protests broke out in Benghazi. Frustrated with their 
country’s lack of economic development and with the personalized nature of the regime, 
citizens demanded that Gaddafi cede control of the state immediately. Gaddafi, however, 
stood his ground and made it clear that he would not step down. Thus began a struggle 
that lasted the better part of eight months, which began as protest but turned into armed 
conflict within the span of two weeks.3 NATO forces stepped in in March 2011 and 
launched “Operation Unified Protector” to protect Libyan citizens. This is particularly 
important because in no other Arab Spring nations have Western countries staged a 
massive military intervention.  
On October 20, 2011, Gaddafi was killed and Libya officially liberated from his 
rule. Shortly thereafter, the Transitional National Council (TNC) took power, though the 
TNC had problems asserting control over the various militia groups that helped bring 
down Gaddafi, particularly in the West. In August, the TNC handed over control to the 
popularly elected GNC, which now governs Libya.  
 
Foreign Aid Received 
Prior to the February 2011 protests, Libya did not receive much aid from Western 
countries. Indeed, from 2002-2010, Libya received only $170 million in total Western 
aid. Expressed in terms of total GDP, this aid number falls around 0.97 percent. When 
                                                
2 Ibid, p. 7. 
3 Libya." Annual Report 2012. Amnesty International, Jan. 2012. Web. 11 Feb. 2013. 
<http://amnesty.org/en/region/libya/report-2012>. 
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compared to Western aid received by both Egypt ($12.5 billion/5.4 percent of GDP) and 
Jordan ($6.57 billion/22 percent) in the same eight-year period, this number is small.4 
However, when compared to other nations that did not receive much democracy 
assistance, this number becomes more reasonable. To be more specific, Libya received 
approximately $607 million more in foreign assistance than did Bahrain, but received 
approximately $390 million less than Syria received.  
Of the aid Libya received over the past decade, approximately $342.25 million 
has been given by the United States.5 Germany, France, and Italy have also contributed 
significant amounts -- $36 million, $68 million, and $26 million, respectively.  
The government and civil society sector has received $61.7 million in total (.09% 
as share of GDP).6 Aid to this sector dramatically increased after the Arab Spring, with 
$25 million contributed in the last year.7 This sector has received significantly more than 
the economic and infrastructure sector, which has only received $14 million in total.8   
In the past year, aid contributions from all Western nations have increased 
substantially. Indeed, post-Arab Spring, Libya has received $440 million in aid from 
Western nations.9 At the same time, Libya’s aid allocation has remained comparatively 
small. Since the start of the Arab Spring in 2011, Libya has only received $440 million 
(0.7% of GDP), while Egypt (over $5 billion has been allocated; 2.2% in terms of share 
                                                
4 "OECD Statistics (GDP, Unemployment, Income, Population, Labour, Education, Trade, Finance, 
Prices,health,debt...)." OECD.StatExtracts. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, n.d. 
Web. 31 Jan. 2013. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
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of GDP), Tunisia (approximately $1.2 billion has been allocated; 2.6% of GDP), and 
Jordan have all received larger sums of aid.10  
Again, it is important to recognize the size of Libya’s population. Although it 
received less aid in total than did Syria or Yemen, it actually received more aid per 
capita. Therefore, the aid may have helped to produce a different, more positive effect in 
Libya than it did in Syria or Yemen. It is important to keep this factor in mind when 
analyzing the overall outcomes in each nation. 
 
National Response  
1. Military Involvement and Death Toll 
As mentioned earlier, Gaddafi deliberately kept the armed forces weak in order to 
maintain his power base. Instead, Gaddafi relied on his personal security forces, 
composed of his family, tribe, and allied tribes, to protect him and his regime.11  
From the beginning, the clash between these security forces and protestors has 
been bloody and violent. On the second day of the protests, Gaddafi’s forces began to 
shoot protestors; Amnesty International also reports that the forces used “lethal and 
disproportionate force” to try to stamp down the protests.12 This force included firing live 
rounds from automatic assault rifles at unarmed protestors, which injured 1,500 and 
killed 170 within the first five days of the protests.13 
Within two weeks, the struggle turned into an armed conflict. As anti-Gaddafi 
citizen militias acquired abandoned weapons, pro-Gaddafi security forces launched 
                                                
10 Ibid. 
11 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V): Making Sense of Libya. 
12 "Libya." Annual Report 2012. Amnesty International, 2012. Web. 13 Nov. 2012. 
<http://amnesty.org/en/region/libya/report-2012>. 
13 Ibid. 
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“indiscriminate attacks,” firing cannons and GRAD rockets into areas with high civilian 
concentrations.14 For example, the town of Misratah was subject to these attacks 
beginning in May and continuing in June.15 The number of civilians injured or killed is 
unclear, but it was a significant amount.  
In addition to these indiscriminate attacks against innocent civilians, Gaddafi’s 
security forces planted thousands of landmines throughout Libya. Furthermore, security 
forces murdered those they had arrested routinely throughout the conflict, and slew even 
more as the fall of Tripoli became imminent.16  
It was not only the Libyan military that was involved, however. As the conflict in 
Libya began to morph into a civil war in which Gaddafi’s opposition was gravely 
outnumbered, the United Nations Security Council authorized a military intervention 
using NATO forces, in the hopes of “averting a bloody rout of the rebels by loyalist 
forces.”17 On March 19, 2011, American and European forces began a campaign against 
pro-Gaddafi forces using warplanes and missiles. These forces remained in Libya for 
over six months, helping to protect Libyan citizens. It was only with the help of these 
NATO forces that the rebels were able to bring Gaddafi down in October 20, 2011. 
Overall, then, the military was highly involved. The protests quickly turned into 
armed conflict and there was much bloodshed. Though the number killed during the 
                                                
14 "World Report 2012: Libya | Human Rights Watch." World Report 2012: Tunisia. Human 
Rights Watch, 2012. Web. 13 Nov. 2012. <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-
libya>. 
15 “Libya,” Amnesty International, 2012. 
16 Ibid. 
17"Libya - the Benghazi Attacks." New York Times, 8 Jan. 2013. Web. 11 Feb. 2013. 
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/libya/index.html>. 
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struggle remains uncertain, it has been estimated around 30,000, with 4,000 still 
missing.18 As such, the conflict would be classified as very bloody.  
 
2. Tangible Results of Protests – Regimes & Elections 
Libya has been only minimally successful in achieving what protestors had 
initially set out to do. Although Gaddafi’s repressive regime fell and elections were 
eventually held, Libya is still dealing with a host of problems related to rogue militias and 
the most recent Benghazi attacks.  
Initially following Gaddafi’s fall, the Transitional National Council governed the 
majority of the country, though it had problems controlling the various militias formed 
during the conflict.19 This interim government was formed on February 27, 2011 and was 
formally recognized as the legitimate government of Libya by the United States on July 
15, 2011.20 The TNC recognized the need for free and fair elections in order to move 
Libya in the direction of democracy, and so implemented elections for a General National 
Congress that would replace the TNC.  
On July 7, 2012, Libyans voted on this new 200-person General National 
Congress.21 This election marked the first general election since 1952 – in which only 
                                                
18 Laub, Karin. "Libya: Estimated 30,000 Died In War; 4,000 Still Missing." The Huffington Post. 
TheHuffingtonPost.com, 08 Sept. 2011. Web. 13 Nov. 2012. 
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19 “Libya,” Amnesty International, 2012. 
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men over 21 could vote -- before Gaddafi came to power.22 On August 8, the TNC 
conceded its power to the GNC and recognized it as the legitimate governing body in 
Libya.23 Parliamentary elections are to be held in 2013. 
  Although these were positive steps, Libya has yet to achieve a comfortable 
democracy in which the central government maintains power without reverting back to a 
dictatorship. Indeed, according to Dirk Vandewalle, the September 11 attacks in 
Benghazi demonstrated the “power of radical Islamic militias and the inability of the 
government in Tripoli to provide security and maintain order across the country,” and as 
such, Libya still has some distance to go before it achieves the functioning democracy it 
desires.24 
 
3. Human Rights 
From 2010 to 2012, there has been an improvement in human rights. I examined 
the same five factors (freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, detention and torture, 
women’s rights, and freedom of religion) and was able to conclude that there was 
improvement in three of the five areas examined, these being: freedom of expression, 
freedom of assembly and association, and freedom of religion. It is important to 
recognize, however, that women have generally enjoyed the same legal protection that 
men have, and thus, not seeing an improvement in this area is hardly a negative.  
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Prior to the uprising and ensuing armed conflict, Libyans lived in a highly 
repressive state based on the Jamahiriya. The Gaddafi regime restricted freedoms in 
almost all areas. The Gaddafi regime controlled the media and blocked websites that were 
in opposition to the regime.25 Additionally, journalists were harassed and “defamation” 
was considered a criminal offense.26 After the Gaddafi regime was overthrown, there was 
improvement in this area. During and after the conflict, at least 130 independent media 
outlets had registered with the NTC, and a significant number of Libyans began using 
social media websites to share their experiences during the protests.27 
There was also improvement in the area of assembly and association. In 2010, 
while the Gaddafi regime was still in power, assembly was illegal and there were no 
independent NGOs.28 Association was generally restricted, unless it directly supported 
the government. After the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, the TNC supported the 
creation of political parties and promoted political participation.29 Additionally, domestic 
NGOs are now allowed to practice in Libya.30  
Unfortunately, there has not been any improvement in the area of detention and 
torture. During Gaddafi’s rule, many prisoners were arbitrarily detained, oftentimes long 
after they were set to be released.31 Furthermore, torture was not infrequent during 
Gaddafi’s rule. In 2012, arbitrary detention and torture still occur, although not at the 
hands of the government. Instead, the militias that were formed during the conflict are 
                                                
25 "Libya." Freedom House - Freedom in the World. Freedom House, 2011. Web. 13 Nov. 2012. 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/libya>. 
26 Ibid. 
27 "Libya." Freedom House - Freedom in the World. Freedom House, 2012. Web. 13 Nov. 2012. 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/libya>. 
28 “Libya.” Freedom House, 2011. 
29 “Libya.” Freedom House, 2012. 
30 Ibid. 
31 "Libya." Annual Report 2011. Amnesty International, 2011. Web. 13 Nov. 2012. 
<http://amnesty.org/en/region/libya/report-2011>. 
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still rampant, abducting citizens and torturing them for no apparent reason.32 
Unfortunately, the TNC, and now the GNC, has had difficulty controlling these militias.   
There has also not been any improvement in the area of women’s rights, though, 
as mentioned earlier, this is not necessarily a negative thing. Under the Gaddafi regime, 
women enjoyed much of the same legal protection as men, though women without 
families were vulnerable to arbitrary detention. Unfortunately, although women are 
supposed to enjoy the same legal rights as men, social norms dictate discrimination and 
these social norms have not changed since Gaddafi’s fall.33  
Finally, there has been a small amount of improvement in the area of freedom of 
religion. Most Libyans are Muslim and under the Gaddafi regime, those who were not 
were still able to practice their religion without being discriminated against.34 The 
Gaddafi regime did, however, keep a close eye on groups for signs of Islamist activity.35 
On the other hand, in 2012, different types of Muslims were allowed to organize 
themselves and debate their views more openly than in 2010.36 That said, there was 
improvement in this area as well.  
Overall then, there was an improvement in the area of human rights. Though it 
was not a large improvement, after the fall of Gaddafi, Libyans did enjoy more freedom 
in terms of expression, assembly and association, and religion. As progress was made in 
three of five human rights areas, it is possible to conclude that there was an improvement. 
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Conclusion 
On the whole, Libya was not all that successful in its response to the protests. 
Although Gaddafi’s repressive regime was overthrown, elections were held, and there 
was an improvement in human rights, the means by which these ends were achieved were 
far from ideal. Indeed, Gaddafi’s military forces were highly involved in the conflict and 
the death toll was astronomical. In addition to this, the political and economic institutions 
in Libya remain weak and unable to provide the necessary security and stability. That 
said, Libya’s response was less successful than Egypt’s and Tunisia’s, which is consistent 
with the original hypothesis. Libya received less democracy aid than both Egypt and 
Tunisia over the last decade and its transition to democracy was not as successful as those 
nations, which received significantly more democracy assistance. Even though hundreds 
of millions have been given in the past year, Libya continues to struggle with maintaining 
stability and fostering democracy.
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YEMEN 
Yemen has had transition unlike the countries examined thus far. Indeed, the 
transition itself was relatively calm, though the events leading up to it were violent. 
Additionally, the situation in Yemen has seen an unprecedented amount of foreign 
intervention, although not militarily as was the case in Libya.  
 
Country Dynamics: Before and After the Arab Spring 
Prior to the uprisings, which began in January 2011, Yemenis were subject to a 
repressive government, headed by a president who had been in power for thirty-three 
years. Yemen was not an electoral democracy – indeed, only two sets of presidential 
lections had been held since 1978, the most recent occurring in 2006, in which President 
Saleh was reelected with 77 percent of the vote.1 It is important to note, however, that 
elections were generally unfair. Additionally, there were almost no limits on executive 
influence. Hence, Yemeni citizens were subject to Saleh’s rule with little room for 
disagreement. Yemen was also severely impoverished – ranked 154 out of 178 on the 
United Nations Human Development Index – and continues to struggle with this 
destitution even after the protests.2   
Although the protests have ended, there is still much turmoil in Yemen, and many 
steps yet to be taken. As a result of Gulf Cooperation Council negotiations, President 
Saleh stepped down from the presidency and handed over his powers to his vice-
                                                
1 "Yemen." Yemen | Freedom in the World 2012. Freedom House, Jan. 2012. Web. 11 Feb. 2013. 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/yemen>. 
2 Sharp, Jeremy M. "Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations." Federation of American Scientists. 
Congressional Research Service, 1 Nov. 2012. Web. 10 Feb. 2013. 
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president, Hadi. Elections were held in February 2012 and there are prospects for a 
National Dialogue Conference aimed at restructuring the constitution prior to the 2014 
elections.3 At the same time, political corruption and warring among political elites has 
continued and partisan politics are still at play in Sana’a.4 Hence, the fate of Yemen 
remains unclear, although there have been steps in a positive direction. 
 
Foreign Aid Received 
Yemen, like Syria, Bahrain, and Libya, has not received much aid from Western 
nations, although recently the United States has increased its assistance as a part of its 
counterterrorism policy.  
From 2002-2011, Yemen received only $2.25 billion in foreign aid (6.2% of 
GDP), about $1 million more than Bahrain and $1 billion less than Syria.5 This is a 
relatively small amount, especially when looked at in relation to the population of 
Yemen, which falls at 24,799,800. Jordan, a much smaller country, has received more 
than twice as much aid as Yemen has. Of the aid that Yemen has received, the United 
States has contributed approximately $405 million, while Germany has also given similar 
sums.6 Interestingly, as a percentage of GDP, in total Yemen received more than Egypt 
did by approximately 1 percent, but still did not respond well to the protests. It is possible 
that this is due to the fact that Yemen received less democracy assistance than Egypt did, 
however. 
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Relevant to the research here is the amount of assistance given to the government 
and civil society sector of Yemen, which focuses explicitly on good governance and 
democracy building. This sector received only $200 million, while sectors such as social 
services and infrastructure received approximately $1.2 billion.7 To put this into 
perspective, Yemen’s GDP is approximately $33.76 billion. Thus, as a percentage of 
GDP, aid directed at the government and civil society falls around 0.06 percent, while the 
aid directed at the social services sector falls around 3.5 percent.  
Important to note is that the assistance did not fluctuate much prior to and after 
the events of the Arab Spring. Although aid did increase substantially between 2002 and 
2010 – by almost $100 million – in 2011, aid contributed remained remarkably similar to 
that received in 2010. In 2010, Yemen received ~$286 million (0.8% of GDP) while in 
2011, aid received totaled about $318 million (0.94%).8 The difference here is small, 
especially when compared to countries such as Tunisia and Egypt, which have been 
promised large sums of aid in the wake of the Arab Spring protests.  
Even with the United States’ recent push for counterterrorism policy in Yemen – 
the Obama administration has requested $72.6 million for FY2013 to combat Al-Qaeda 
cells and other terrorist networks in Yemen – the amount of aid committed to Yemen has 
not increased substantially.9 For example, prior to the Arab Spring protests, the United 
States gave only $19.2 million in aid to Tunisia, while after these protests, in 2011 alone, 
it committed approximately $300 million.10 
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National Response 
1. Military Involvement and Death Toll 
The military was somewhat involved in responding to the protests, although there 
was a significant number of soldiers and citizens that defected from the Saleh regime 
during this period. Indeed, the armed forces essentially split into two factions – pro-Saleh 
and anti-Saleh – and acted accordingly. 11 
Those military forces that were involved in responding to the protests were pro-
Saleh and used “deadly violence” to crackdown on activists.12 According to Human 
Rights Watch, these forces “responded with excessive and deadly force,” oftentimes 
firing live ammunition at unarmed protestors.13 Additionally, these forces blocked 
wounded protestors from accessing appropriate medical care. Interestingly, these forces 
included Central Security, the counterterrorism unit that receives US training.14 As a 
result of this response, approximately 250 Yemeni citizens were killed, while over 1,000 
more were wounded.15 As such, the conflict can be characterized as somewhat bloody, 
while the level of military involvement remained moderate. 
 
2. Tangible Results of the Protests – Regimes & Elections 
There have been a number of positive changes resulting from the protests, 
although there are still improvements that are yet to be seen. Most importantly, the Gulf 
Cooperative Council initiative --- backed by the United Nations -- was signed. The GCC 
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initiative provided President Saleh with immunity from prosecution in exchange for his 
resignation from office, in addition to providing a foundation for a Yemeni transition. To 
be more specific, the first phase of the GCC initiative required that Saleh relinquish 
executive power to his vice-president, Abdo Robo Hadi, and that an opposition-led (JMP) 
national consensus government be established. During this first phase, Hadi also created a 
military council, aimed at reducing tensions between various factions of the armed 
forces.16 This first phase ended on February 21, 2012, when Hadi was officially elected 
as President of Yemen. These elections, however, were not traditional in that Hadi ran 
uncontested.  
In the second phase of the GCC initiative, Hadi and his government have been 
tasked with “restructur[ing] the military-security apparatus and address[ing] issues of 
transnational justice,” in addition to creating a National Dialogue Conference in which 
various parties will come together and revise the Yemeni constitution prior to the 2014 
elections.17 As of July 2012, however, Hadi has struggled to achieve many of the above 
goals and thus, it would appear that this second phase of the plan may have been too 
ambitious.18   
The protests in Yemen, then, yielded some results similar to those in Egypt, 
Libya, and Tunisia, although the way in which these results were achieved was notably 
different from that in the aforementioned nations.  Indeed, in most nations, it was the 
conflict that caused regime change, and further, elections – for the most part, other 
nations did not step in to aid in negotiations as they did in Yemen. 
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Although some change has been seen with respect to the Yemeni political system, 
much has also stayed the same. For example, ICG reports that the highly personalized 
conflict between Saleh and his family and powerful general Al-Ahmar and his family still 
rages on, though it has taken on a form different from before. Additionally, the political 
economy of corruption is still present and the same families control national resources, 
using patronage networks to influence governmental decisions.19 The struggle then can be 
characterized as an elite power struggle more than anything else, and “for frustrated, 
independent activists, [it] amounts to little more than a reshuffling of the political 
deck.”20 
 
3. Human Rights  
According to various human rights organizations, humanitarian conditions have 
rapidly deteriorated as the political struggle continues. Indeed, many Yemeni citizens 
have had difficulty accessing basic goods such as food.21 For the purposes of this 
research, I again looked at the same five factors that make up a foundation for human 
rights (freedom of expression, freedom of association, torture and detention, freedom of 
religion, and women’s rights) and found no improvement in any of the areas from 2010 to 
2012. On the whole, human rights abuses continued to occur even after the protests began 
and Saleh was removed from power. 
In 2010, the vast majority of radio and TV stations were controlled by the state. 
Newspapers and magazines that published anything remotely critical of the government 
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were shut down.22 Additionally, the government blocked websites that were considered 
“revolutionary.”23 Thus, freedom of expression was limited. In 2012, Human Rights 
Watch reported a “significant” improvement in freedom of expression, although 
journalists continued to be harassed and prosecuted.24 That said, there was at least some 
improvement in this area, although I do not agree with HRW’s classification of a 
significant improvement. 
There was a small improvement in the area of freedom of assembly and 
association. In 2010, prior to the protests, there was some freedom of assembly; however, 
protests that the government deemed threatening were subject to violent interventions by 
security forces.25 Under Article 58 of the Yemeni constitution, citizens are free to form 
associations and there are a number of non-governmental organizations that exist in 
Yemen. In actuality, however, the government restricted this freedom. In 2012, there was 
a slight improvement in this area. The Yemeni government allowed several new 
associations to register, including new political parties and near 100 non-governmental 
organizations.26   
In the area of torture and detention, there was also only a minimal improvement. 
In 2010, arbitrary detention was common, “partly because law enforcement officers lack 
proper training and senior governmental officials lack the will to eliminate the 
problem.”27 In 2012, this remained common, although dozens of arbitrarily detained 
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prisoners were released.28 At the same time, however, many still remain in prisons run by 
the government and opposition forces. Additionally, there are reports of torture. Thus, 
there was hardly an improvement in this area. 
Although the Yemeni constitution recognizes religious freedom, it is oftentimes 
constrained. Indeed, Islam is the official religion of Yemen, and all law is grounded in 
Sharia.29 Additionally, no non-Muslims are allowed to run for positions within 
parliament, and Jews are not allowed to run for any federal position.30 Furthermore, 
religious minorities have been targets of discrimination in the past.31 This did not change 
in 2012, and there is not yet any report on the status of freedom of religion for 2013. 
Finally, there was no change in the area of women’s rights. In 2010, women were 
discriminated against and held low public status and this continued in 2012.32 The only 
positive here is that the blueprint for the democratic transition has “envisaged adequate 
representation of women in all political bodies, during and after the transition.”33 This 
vision, however, has thus far, remained just that. 
According to Freedom House, an organization that ranks nations based on civil 
liberties, in 2011, Yemen’s ranking actually declined from 5 to 6 because of the violent 
way in which the government responded to the protests.34 
 
Conclusion 
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Yemen’s response has been unlike that of the other countries examined here. 
Although there was a “regime change,” it was more of a “political game of musical 
chairs” than anything.35 Yemen continues to deal with a host of problems – including 
corruption and personalized conflict. Additionally, the military was involved in 
responding to the protests and the conflict was somewhat bloody. As such, one might 
actually characterize Yemen’s response as only minimally successful. The protests led to 
the GCC initiative, but this initiative did not provide for a complete upheaval of the 
political system, as was the case in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia.  
Yemen’s minimally successful response is, however, consistent with the original 
hypothesis: that Western democracy assistance can help foster a successful response to 
the protests, including a transition to a more legitimate democracy. Yemen received only 
a small amount of Western democracy aid and took only small steps to foster an electoral 
democracy. These steps are nowhere near as dramatic as those in Egypt or Tunisia, where 
the amount of aid received was much larger (0.15 percent and 0.1 percent, respectively). 
Therefore, the situation in Yemen supports the original hypothesis.
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BAHRAIN 
Country Dynamics: Before & After the Arab Spring 
Bahrain, like Libya, has a unique history that has made for an uprising dissimilar 
from the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco. For over two centuries, the 
al-Khalifa family has held power in Bahrain, making it the family that has remained in 
power the longest out of all of the Arab Spring countries. Problematic here is that the al-
Khalifa family is part of the Sunni minority that rules over the Shiite majority, which has 
contributed to rising tensions between the two Islamic sects. This has also contributed to 
the al-Khalifa family’s desire to remain in power. The current king, Sheikh Hamad bin 
Isa al-Khalifa, took the throne in 1999 and set forth the 2001 National Charter, which 
proposed the creation of a constitutional monarchy. Despite the creation of this 
constitutional monarchy and the Shiite sect acquiring 17 of 40 seats in the National 
Assembly, tensions between the two Islamic sects continued to escalate, most notably 
before the October 2010 parliamentary elections.1 The government has also restricted 
most freedoms in Bahrain by blocking dissenting websites, disallowing protests and 
demonstrations, and maintaining control over all media broadcast channels.2 
Beginning as a disorganized youth movement in February 2011 calling for 
reformation of the constitutional monarchy, the uprising in Bahrain grew into a full-
fledged protest by March 2011, with prolific demands for the complete removal of the 
regime. The regime, however, was unresponsive to the protests and engaged in a massive 
crackdown, concerned with maintaining its grip on the nation. Indeed, in mid-March 
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2011, approximately one and a half months into the protests, the al-Khalifa regime called 
in Gulf Cooperation Council troops to protect the government from what they saw as “the 
proxies of Iran,” or their own Shiite population.3  
Thus, dynamics have remained largely the same after the Arab Spring. Bahrain 
has seen little in the way of reform as a result of the protests, and the national response 
has been swift and harsh. Repression continues to characterize Bahrain, and King Hamad 
of the al-Khalifa family remains in power. Opposition leaders in Bahrain claim that it has 
been “forgotten” and was “forgotten” even when the Arab Spring began in February 
2011, due to various nations’ strategic interests in the region.4 Overall, then, the nation 
has not experienced positive change as a result of the uprising, and continues to be 
enmeshed in an internal conflict between Sunnis and Shiites.  
 
Foreign Aid Received 
Foreign aid statistics for Bahrain were difficult to find and further, difficult to 
corroborate. According to OECD statistics, Bahrain has received only $2.1 million from 
DAC countries in the 2002-2011 period, less than every other Arab Spring country 
studied thus far.5 However, ForeignAssistance.gov statistics report that since 2008, 
approximately $74.8 million has been appropriated to Bahrain.6 It is important to be 
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aware of the difference between these two statistical measures – OECD statistics measure 
gross disbursements, while ForeignAssistance.gov statistics measure appropriations. 
Disbursements refer to the actual money paid to Bahrain, while appropriations refer to the 
authorization of this payment, but not the actual payment itself. Regardless of the 
measure used here, Bahrain has still received the smallest amount of aid when compared 
to all of the other nations studied. The closest comparison nation would be Libya, and 
even it received hundreds of millions more than Bahrain. To put this into perspective, 
Bahrain’s GDP is $22.95 billion. Therefore, as a share of GDP, the foreign aid received 
by Bahrain falls around 0.03 percent, while the aid Libya received falls around 0.97 
percent.7  
Particularly interesting is the lack of aid given directly to the government and 
civil society sector. In neither the OECD statistics nor the ForeignAssistance.gov 
statistics was there any report of money going towards establishing a democratic regime. 
Instead, ForeignAssistance.gov reports aid flows to the Peace and Security sector, which 
focuses specifically on addressing international and national security threats as well as 
counterterrorism.8  
In addition to this appropriation to the Peace and Security sector, Bahrain did -- 
and continues to -- receive military assistance from the United States because the United 
States has a large base stationed in Bahrain. According to the State Department, the 
United States assists Bahrain in “obtain[ing] the equipment and training it needs to 
operate alongside U.S. air and naval forces.”9 Hence, the US maintains its strategic 
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interests by assisting Bahrain militarily.  In addition to this, the State Department reports 
that the United States has been supportive of Bahrain’s reform attempts, especially 
through diplomacy and the Middle East Peace Initiative.10  
 
National Response 
1. Military Involvement & Death Toll 
In Bahrain, military involvement was heavy from the onset. Protests started 
February 14, 2011, and almost immediately following, security forces stepped in to 
control the protests. On February 17, 2011, when protestors blocked a major route on the 
Bahrain Financial Harbor, police reacted violently, killing seven.11 There were additional 
reports of brutality, which did not subside as the protests continued. On March 14, 2011, 
after a particularly violent clash between protestors and security forces, Gulf Cooperation 
Council troops -- composed primarily of Saudis -- entered Bahrain, purportedly to 
“protect government facilities after weeks of unrest,” in addition to 500 police troops sent 
from the United Arab Emirates.12  
Shortly thereafter, King Hamad declared a state of emergency and enacted a “Law 
of National Security,” which granted forces the right to use whatever means necessary to 
quash the protests.13 It additionally established military “Courts of National Security,” in 
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which protestors were tried and sentenced, oftentimes for life.14 Bahraini security forces 
and GCC troops engaged in a “systematic campaign of retribution,” arresting thousands 
of demonstrators and wounding hundreds more.15 According to human rights reports, 
security forces were accused of torture and ill-treatment prior to the introduction of GCC 
troops, and after the Law of National Security was enacted, “came down…even harder” 
on protestors, violently suppressing them.16 On multiple occasions, security forces used 
tear gas, shotguns, and rubber bullets to suppress demonstrations, in addition to violently 
beating protestors with batons.17 Not only this, but medical personnel attempting to help 
those hurt or wounded were assaulted and detained by forces for “supporting the 
protestors.”18 
Even after the Law of National Security was repealed on June 1, 2011, harsh 
treatment continued. It became clear that Shiites were the target of this campaign of 
retribution, especially after the government laid off primarily Shiite workers and security 
forces destroyed Shiite mosques.  
The death toll as a result of the conflict is not high, especially when compared to 
Libya and Syria, but the violence exhibited by security forces counterweighs this. Though 
the exact number is uncertain, in January 2012, the death toll was thought to be 
somewhere around 50, with thousands of others wounded.19 Hence, the conflict can be 
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characterized as somewhat bloody. Indeed, the death toll is well below tolls in Libya and 
Syria, and is even smaller than those in Egypt and Tunisia. 
On the whole, the military has been heavily involved in suppressing the protests, and 
although security forces took violent action against demonstrators, including torture, the 
death toll remained relatively low compared to other Arab Spring countries. 
 
2. Tangible Results of the Protests – Regimes & Elections 
At present, there are not any tangible results of the protests. The al-Khalifa family 
remains in power, with King Hamad still ruling. Additionally, no elections have been 
held. Many claim that the uprising in Bahrain has been ignored almost completely, and as 
such, the regime has had a relatively easy time remaining in power.20 Indeed, as the 
European Union and the United States have regional interests at stake, intervening in the 
situation in Bahrain would be disadvantageous for both. 
Interestingly, prior to and even during the uprising, there were negotiations in 
progress between the crown prince and the largest organized opposition group in Bahrain, 
Al-Wifaq, “aimed at identifying conditions for launching a formal dialogue” between the 
two parties.21 Though initially the negotiations appeared promising, they ultimately 
failed, mainly due to the emergence and length of the protests. Indeed, as the protests 
dragged on, each side became more resolved to hold their position and give no 
concessions, resulting in gridlock and eventual failure.22 Even when small agreements 
were reached, they were soon overturned as the demands of protestors increased. It was 
not only time, however, that caused the negotiations to fail. It is likely that they would 
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not have been fully successful anyway, as Al-Wifaq desired a reform of the regime, and 
was particularly set on the creation of a Constituent Assembly.23 The al-Khalifa regime, 
on the other hand, saw the creation of an Assembly as “the beginning of the end,” 
believing that an Assembly would lead to Shiite domination and ultimately, an ousting 
from power.24 Even with the negotiations, the protests were unsuccessful in achieving 
any sort of reformed government, let alone a new government.  
 
3. Human Rights 
There has been no improvement in the area of human rights after the protests. I 
examined the same five areas (freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, detention 
and torture, women’s rights, and freedom of religion), and concluded that in the areas of 
freedom of expression and detention and torture, human rights conditions actually 
worsened. In all other areas, the condition of human rights remained the same.  
Like most other countries examined in this paper, Bahrain was very repressive 
prior to the Arab Spring because the ruling party wanted to remain in power. In 2009, 
prior to the eruption of the protests, the press law restricted the coverage of “controversial 
matters,” especially if they pertained to the government.25 Additionally, the government 
maintained control over the Internet and blocked over one thousand “opposition” sites.26 
Hence, freedom of expression was limited. As protests broke out in 2011, restrictions on 
expression actually worsened. For example, many journalists and bloggers were detained 
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for responding to the pro-democracy movement, and the government blocked more 
“opposition” sites, especially those that broadcast the protests live.27 
There was no improvement in the area of freedom of assembly and association. In 
2009, formal political parties were illegal and citizens were required to obtain a license 
for demonstration purposes.28 Even with the license, demonstrations were banned 
between sunrise and sunset and as such, made it difficult for protests to really have an 
impact. Additionally, associations like the Bahrain Center for Human Rights were denied 
legal status. In 2011, conditions remained the same and could be said to have worsened in 
the area of freedom of assembly. Political parties remained illegal, and there was, as 
illustrated above, a harsh and violent crackdown on demonstrators.29 
In the area of detention and torture, human rights conditions worsened. In 2009, 
there were numerous allegations of “due process violations” like coerced confessions30, 
as well as reports of torture while in custody.31 In 2011, these reports continued. Those 
that were arrested were held incommunicado for extended periods of time and were 
tortured with electric shocks and sleep deprivation, and were also beaten and sexually 
assaulted.32 Most that reported the torture were rearrested and no investigations were 
launched.33 
There was no change in the area of women’s rights between 2009 and 2011. 
Although women are allowed to vote under the constitutional monarchy, they are 
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discriminated against due to social and community norms.34 Furthermore, Sharia judges 
are biased toward men, and women are not allowed to pass on their nationality to their 
children if they are married to a non-Bahraini man.35 Although women’s rights have seen 
an improvement over the last decade, there was no improvement prior to and after the 
protests. 
Finally, there was no change in the area of the freedom of religion. This, however, 
should not be seen as a negative. In 2009, although the state religion was Islam, minority 
religions were generally respected and allowed to practice without punishment or 
discrimination.36  They were, however, required to obtain a license from the Ministry of 
Justice and Islamic Affairs to practice legally. In 2011, this remained the same. However, 
the crackdown on Shiite activists resulted in the destruction of over 40 Shiite places of 
worship.37 
 
Conclusion 
On the whole, Bahrain’s response to the protests has been poor. There was heavy 
military involvement, although the death toll remained low compared to Syria and Libya. 
Additionally, the al-Khalifa family remains in power and no elections have been held. 
Finally, there has been no improvement in the area of human rights. There was no 
attempted transition to democracy because the al-Khalifa regime was able to quash the 
protests. 
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This unsuccessful response is consistent with the proposed hypothesis: that those 
nations that received a significant amount of Western democracy assistance responded 
more positively to protests and were more successful in their transitions to democracy, 
while those that received only a small amount of Western democracy assistance 
responded poorly and were less successful. Bahrain received only a small amount of 
Western democracy assistance compared to all nations studied, and was less successful in 
its response to the protests. As mentioned, Egypt and Tunisia, and Jordan to some extent, 
all which received a good deal of Western democracy aid, responded more successfully 
than countries that did not receive much Western aid, like Syria, Libya, and Bahrain.
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SYRIA
Country Dynamics: Before & After the Arab Spring 
Syria continues to be in a state of flux. It is still entwined in a civil war and as 
such, the ultimate result of the Arab Spring in this country has yet to be seen. 
Historically, Syria has been a repressive state, and it has continued in this manner even 
after the start of the protests. In particular, the government has enacted a number of laws 
to ensure that political dissenters and critics are punished. Syria is not an electoral 
democracy; the 1973 constitution requires that the president be nominated by the Ba’ath 
party and approved by popular referendum, though the referendum is largely fixed and 
organized by the government.1 Hence, almost all power lies in the executive branch. In 
addition to this, an Emergency Law has governed the nation since the 1963 coup in which 
the Ba’ath party assumed power. 
Unlike the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, the uprising in Syria has been neither 
speedy nor very successful. Starting in mid-March 2011, the Syrian conflict has dragged 
on for almost twenty months. Violence characterizes the conflict, both from the regime as 
it attempts to hold on to its power, and from the opposition, as it becomes increasingly 
frustrated with the regime’s treatment of the problem. In July 2011, opposition forces 
began to unite, and as of November 2012, all opposition forces have come together to 
create the National Coalition Forces of the Syrian Revolution.2 As of June 2012, the 
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conflict in Syria has mutated into a civil war.3 The fissure between regime sympathizers 
and regime opponents continues to grow, maintaining the divided nature of the conflict. 
The indefinite nature of the armed conflict makes it impossible to judge what the result of 
this conflict is. It is still possible, however, to come to some conclusion about the 
effectiveness of Western aid based on the situation thus far. 
 
Foreign Aid Received 
Syria has not received much foreign aid from the West. From 2002-2011, Syria 
received $1.3 billion in foreign aid from Western nations (2.2 percent of total GDP).4 
Although this number seems large when taken out of context, when compared to Egypt, 
Tunisia, and Jordan – who received $12.5 billion (5.4 percent of GDP), $5 billion (11 
percent of GDP), and $6.57 billion (22 percent of GDP), respectively -- it is quite small. 5 
At the same time, this amount is more than what Libya and Bahrain received in the same 
period (approximately $200 million and $2.45 million).6  
Of the aid Syria has received over this period, the United States has donated only 
$61 million, which is significantly less than what it gave to all other nations studied aside 
from Bahrain.7 France and Germany, however, have been the two largest donors to Syria 
over this period, donating $407.18 million and $212.21 million respectively.8  
                                                
3 Sterling, Joe. "Is Syria in a Civil War?" CNN. Cable News Network, 13 June 2012. Web. 29 Nov. 2012. 
<http://articles.cnn.com/2012-06-13/middleeast/world_meast_syria-civil-war_1_james-fearon-civil-war-
rebel-group/2?_s=PM:MIDDLEEAST>. 
4 "OECD Statistics (GDP, Unemployment, Income, Population, Labour, Education, Trade, Finance, 
Prices,health,debt...)." OECD.StatExtracts. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, n.d. 
Web. 31 Jan. 2013. 
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
  91 
Again, relevant to the research here is the amount of assistance given to the 
government and civil society sector. This sector received approximately $42 million over 
the past decade (0.07 percent of total GDP), of which the United States contributed $4.2 
million.9 Germany, the largest donor, contributed $17.5 million to this sector.10 At the 
same time, there were other sectors that received more than this one. For example, the 
social services sector received $820 million.11  
As the conflict escalates, the United States continues to aid the Syrian opposition 
coalition. In the past year and a half, the United States has given approximately $200 
million in non-lethal, humanitarian aid to the opposition in the hopes of ultimately 
ousting the Assad regime.12 Most recently, in February 2013, the United States pledged 
$60 million to the Syrian rebels in order to provide “basic services.”13 
 
National Response 
1. Military Involvement & Death Toll 
Both the military involvement and death toll have been astronomical in Syria. 
Indeed, the Assad administration has used both “security” and “military” solutions in an 
attempt to control the conflict, inflicting violence on its own citizens.14  
                                                
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Gordts, Eline. "Syria Conflict: U.S. Announces $30 Million Additional Aid." The Huffington Post. 
TheHuffingtonPost.com, 14 Nov. 2012. Web. 06 Feb. 2013. 
13 Gordon, Mark and Michael Landler. "U.S. Pledges $60 Million to Syrian Opposition." The New York 
Times. The New York Times, 28 Feb. 2013. Web. 28 Feb. 2013. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/01/world/middleeast/us-pledges-60-million-to-syrian-
opposition.html?_r=0>. 
14 "Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People’s Slow-Motion 
Revolution.” International Crisis Group, 6 July 2011. Web. 29 Nov. 2012, p. 15. 
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/egypt-syria-lebanon/syria/108-popular-
protest-in-north-africa-and-the-middle-east-vi-the-syrian-peoples-slow-motion-revolution.aspx> 
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To be sure, the International Crisis Group explains the Syrian government’s 
response to the protests as a series of three stages, each of which has largely failed and 
has only resulted in the escalation of an already violent conflict. The first stage was 
centered on largely superficial political concessions coupled with “brutal repression.”15 
Almost immediately following the uprisings, security forces responded with violence, 
killing and detaining numerous Syrian citizens, many being children under the age of 
eighteen.16 This harsh repression did not quell protestors, though. In fact, it increased 
frustrations and encouraged them to continue.  
The Assad administration understood that its first solution had failed and as such, 
it implemented the second stage, or the “security solution.” Operations were launched in 
Daraa -- the site of the initial protests -- as well as additional neighborhoods. These 
operations were brutal and bloody, with arbitrary arrests, death, and torture.17 Even this 
solution did not discourage demonstrators; it instead pushed them in the direction of 
armed conflict. 18 Yet again, the solution failed. 
Determined not to cede power, in January 2012, Assad’s regime implemented the 
“military solution,” which essentially was a “scorched earth policy of rampant destruction 
and looting that turned what was once viewed as a national army into a reviled 
occupation force.”19 This solution has largely failed and has ensnared the nation in a state 
of bitter and bloody civil war. Although the Assad regime has “been stripped down to 
a…cohesive, hardcore faction fighting an increasingly…fierce and naked struggle for 
                                                
15 Ibid. 
16 "World Report 2012: Syria." Human Rights Watch, 2012. Web. 29 Nov. 2012. 
<http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-syria>. 
17 Ibid. 
18 International Crisis Group, 2011.  
19 Ibid, p. i.  
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collective survival,” it refuses to give in, and the opposition also shows no signs of letting 
up.20 
The death toll as a result of this conflict and the ensuing civil war is enormous. As 
of November 2012, opposition forces report 37,000 dead,21 while other groups estimate a 
number around 26,000.22 Regardless, the death toll is close to that of Libya, and much 
higher than in Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan combined.  
Overall, then, the security forces and the military have been highly involved 
throughout the conflict, engaging in brutal and bloody violence to suppress protestors and 
protect Assad’s regime. Somewhere between 26,000 and 37,000 have died, and as such, 
this conflict can be characterized as very bloody.  
 
2. Tangible Results of Protests – Regimes & Elections 
As of now, there have not been any tangible, positive results of the protests. The 
Assad regime remains in tact and elections certainly have not been held. Aside from the 
superficial political concessions used by Assad in an attempt to placate protestors in mid-
March 2011, nothing has changed.  
Following the mid-March protests, Assad released dozens of political prisoners, 
dismissed the government, and lifted the state of emergency.23 As mentioned, these were 
only superficial measures and drove protestors to make more demands, which were left 
                                                
20 Ibid. 
21 Abedine, Saad. "Over 37,000 Have Died in Syria's Civil War, Opposition Group Says."CNN. Cable 
News Network, 15 Nov. 2012. Web. 29 Nov. 2012. <http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/15/world/meast/syria-
civil-war/>. 
22 Khan, Azmat. "Syria's Shocking Civilian Death Toll." The Battle for Syria. PBS, 14 Sept. 2012. Web. 29 
Nov. 2012. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/foreign-affairs-defense/battle-for-syria/syrias-
shocking-civilian-death-toll/>. 
23 "Syria Profile." BBC News. BBC, 20 Nov. 2012. Web. 29 Nov. 2012. 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14703995>. 
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unfulfilled. In May 2012, Assad held parliamentary elections, but the opposition in Syria 
viewed these elections as a mere charade.24 Indeed, similar to Mubarak’s 2006 
constitutional reformation that allowed more than one party to run in the election but 
yielded no palpable change in reality, the Syrian elections were a façade of democracy 
but in actuality, remained under control of regime.25  
Thus, as of November 2012, there are no tangible results. The concessions made 
in March 2011 virtually did nothing to change the state of the government and did not 
mollify demonstrators enough to stop them from protesting. The parliamentary elections 
were seen as a charade, and thus, cannot be considered a real, positive change in the 
direction of democracy. Bashar al-Assad’s regime remains in power, though it has been 
reduced to only a shell of what it once was. Conflict reigns freely, with no sign of 
stopping.   
 
3. Human Rights 
There has been no improvement in the area of human rights. I examined the same 
five areas (freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, torture, women’s 
rights, and freedom of religion) and was able to conclude that there was no improvement 
in any of these areas, and torture actually increased as a result of the protests.  
In 2010, Syria was a repressive state. Under the state of emergency, authorities 
were permitted to arbitrarily detain and punish critics. Additionally, the 2001 press law 
allows authorities to arrest dissenters and requires publications to obtain a license, which 
                                                
24 Kinninmont, Jane. "Syria's Election Charade Could Trigger Yet More Unrest." The Guardian. Guardian 
News and Media, 09 May 2012. Web. 29 Nov. 2012. 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/may/09/syria-electoral-charade-more-unrest>. 
25 Ibid. 
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authorities can revoke or deny at any time.26 Furthermore, the internet is censored – 
approximately 160 sites were blocked in 2010.27 Although the state of emergency was 
lifted in 2011, freedom of expression has not increased. The press law remains in place – 
journalists continue to be routinely “disappeared” and punished, while the government 
continues to censor the Internet.28 At this point, almost 200 sites have been blocked. 29   
There was also no change in freedom of assembly and association. In 2010, 
“human rights NGOs and opposition political parties were denied legal authorization”30 
and public demonstrations were considered illegal without proper consent.31 
Additionally, no group with greater than six people was allowed to discuss economic or 
political issues, and this was enforced via informant networks and intensive 
surveillance.32 In 2011, all of the above remained the same.33 
Detention and torture actually worsened in 2011. In 2010, torture was widespread 
and used in almost all detention facilities.34 Authorities detained citizens without arrest 
warrants and held them incommunicado for protracted periods of time.35 In 2011, torture 
became even more prevalent as thousands linked to the protests were detained. Prisoners 
                                                
26 "Syria 2010." Syria | Freedom in the World. Freedom House, 2010. Web. 29 Nov. 2012. 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/syria>. 
27 Ibid. 
28 “Syria 2012.” Syria | Freedom in the World. Freedom House, 2010. Web. 29 Nov 2012. 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/syria>. 
29 Ibid. 
30 "Syria." Annual Report 2011. Amnesty International, 2011. Web. 29 Nov. 2012. 
<http://amnesty.org/en/region/syria/report-2011>. 
31 “Syria 2010,” Freedom House. 
32 “Syria,” Annual Report 2011. 
33 Ibid. 
34 “Syria 2012.” Freedom House, 2012. 
35 "World Report 2010: Syria." Human Rights Watch, 2012. Web. 29 Nov. 2010. 
<http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87733 >. 
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were subjected to electric shocks, beatings, whippings, and other gruesome acts until they 
gave up the “information” the authorities desired.36 
Although the Syrian constitution touts gender equality, in 2010, women were 
discriminated against.37 Indeed, the Personal Status Law assigned women an inferior 
status.38 A law was passed in 2011, which increased the penalty for the murder or sexual 
assault of a woman.39 However, discrimination and violence against women still 
regularly occurs.  
There was a small negative change in freedom of religion. For the most part, 
freedom of worship was and continues to be tolerated in Syria. However, in 2011, Sunni 
Muslims began to be persecuted by their Alawite superiors and sectarian polarization 
increased as a result of the conflict.40 Hence, there was a negative change between 2010 
and 2011 in this particular area. 
 
Conclusion 
Syria has, up to this point, elicited a worse response than all other nations studied. 
Although Libya’s death toll and military involvement was much the same as Syria’s, the 
Gadaffi regime was overthrown with the help of NATO intervention, and thus Libya was 
at least slightly more successful than Syria in that regard. Military involvement was high 
and the conflict was and continues to be very bloody, with no tangible results apparent 
                                                
36 “Syria.” Annual Report 2012. Amnesty International, 2012. Web. 29. Nov. 2012. 
<http://amnesty.org/en/region/syria/report-2012>. 
37 "World Report 2012: Syria." Human Rights Watch, 2012.  
38 Ibid. 
39 “Syria,” Annual Report 2012. 
40 Ibid. 
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yet. The Assad regime remains in power and only superficial political concessions have 
been made. Finally, there has been no improvement in the area of human rights.  
All of the above is consistent with they proposed hypothesis: that Western aid can 
help lay the groundwork for positive change. Syria received only a small amount of 
democracy aid and it has been unsuccessful in its response to the protests, especially with 
regards to its transition to democracy. As I have illustrated throughout this paper, nations 
that received a greater amount of Western assistance (e.g. Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, 
Jordan) took much larger and more dramatic steps toward democracy and were ultimately 
more successful in their responses. It is possible then, to see a correlation between the 
amount of Western democracy aid received and the successfulness of a nation in its 
transition. As this is the case, it might be possible to surmise that had Syria received a 
greater amount of aid, it would have responded in a more positive way. 
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Discussion 
I have now analyzed the aid given to each Arab Spring nation and the response of 
each regime. These cases helped me to test the hypothesis set forth at the beginning of the 
paper: that those Arab Spring countries that received a significant amount of Western 
assistance -- more specifically monetary democracy assistance -- responded to the 
protests more successfully than those that did not receive this same assistance. Every 
country did in fact receive some amount of Western aid, even if it was small. Therefore, 
the distinction between the amount of aid received by each nation is crucial, particularly 
in standardized terms.  
The results of this study do in fact support the hypothesis. Those nations that 
received a large sum of Western democracy assistance – Egypt ($12.5 billion), Tunisia 
($5 billion), Jordan ($6.57 billion), and Morocco ($8.7 billion) – were more successful in 
their responsive to the protests and overall, more successful in a shift toward a more 
legitimate democracy. Those nations that received only a small sum of Western 
assistance over the past decade – Yemen ($2.25 billion), Bahrain ($2.45 billion), Libya 
($606 million), and Syria ($1.3 billion) – have been less successful in their responses, 
especially in their transitions to a more legitimate democracy.1 Furthermore, those 
nations that received a greater amount of democracy assistance responded less violently 
and were more successful in their transitions to democracy. Tunisia (0.1% of GDP), 
Egypt (0.15% of GDP), Morocco (0.2% of GDP) and Jordan (1.7% of GDP) responded 
                                                
1 See Appendix for these aid numbers expressed in relation to a nation’s total GDP.  
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more successfully than did Yemen (0.06%), Libya (0.09%), Bahrain (no data available 
for democracy aid) and Syria (0.07%).  
Of all of the Arab Spring nations studied, Tunisia was the most successful in its 
response to the protests. The death toll was low, the military was only slightly involved, 
the old regime was ousted and the nation was successful in creating institutions that 
extended democracy. Elections were held to vote a Constituent Assembly into office, and 
shortly after this, a president was elected. Although there is still some instability in the 
country, Tunisia has managed to maintain these institutions and through them, perpetuate 
democratic ideals. Finally, there has been a large improvement in human rights.  
Egypt was also successful in its response to the protests, although slightly less 
successful than Tunisia. This was because the military was more involved in the conflict 
in Egypt and the death toll was higher than in Tunisia. However, Mubarak stepped down, 
a new president was elected, a new constitution was drafted, and there was some 
improvement in human rights. However, the democratic institutions are still volatile – as 
seen when President Morsi issued a decree granting himself powers beyond court review 
-- but that they have managed to maintain order. 
Morocco was somewhat successful in its response, although not as successful as 
Tunisia and Egypt. Indeed, unlike in Egypt and Tunisia, the Moroccan regime has 
remained in tact throughout the protests, and the King has retained his position, albeit 
with significantly less power than he had initially. This is a positive step though, and is 
worth noting. Additionally, the military has remained on the sidelines for the most part 
and there has only been one reported death. Human rights have not improved 
significantly, however. While Morocco has taken some positive steps toward democracy, 
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it has yet to achieve full democratic status and activists continue to push for greater 
change. Although this is the case, Morocco has clearly had more success than those 
nations that received little Western assistance.  
Jordan was the least successful of the nations that received Western assistance. 
However, it was still more successful than Syria, Bahrain, Libya, and Yemen, particularly 
when looked at in relation to the initial demands of the protestors. Starting out, Jordanian 
protestors demanded less than those protestors in the three other nations and therefore, 
must be evaluated based on those demands. The vast majority of Jordanians desired a 
gradual change, so the results of the protests can actually be viewed in a positive light. 
For example, the fact that the regime was not toppled and that the king retains his power 
is consistent with the desires of the majority of Jordanians. The King has, however, made 
concessions to Jordanian citizens, including replacing the Prime Minister, creating a 
dialogue for reform, and establishing a group to amend the constitution. These are not the 
drastic results seen in Egypt or Tunisia, and so it is possible to conclude that Jordan was 
less successful than these nations in terms of a move toward democracy. Jordan was also 
more successful than all nations in the group that received little democracy assistance 
because the military did not become involved and the death toll remained non-existent.  
Those nations that received only a small amount of Western assistance were less 
successful in their responses to the protests and their attempted transitions to democracy 
also fell short. Of these nations, Yemen was the most successful. Indeed, the president 
stepped down, elections were held, and a National Dialogue Conference has been planned 
in order to reform the constitution. The military was involved in controlling the protests 
in Yemen, however, which makes it less successful than both Morocco and Jordan. 
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Approximately 225 people were killed, whereas in Jordan and Morocco the death toll 
remains in the single digits. There was also no improvement in the area of human rights.  
Yemen continues to deal with corruption and patronage networks.  
Libya was the second most successful in its response to the protests of the 
countries that received little democracy assistance. The regime was overthrown, elections 
were held, and respect for human rights improved, but this did not come at low cost. 
What began as a mere conflict escalated into a civil war in which over 30,000 were 
killed. Additionally, the conflict in Libya required foreign intervention, making it a 
particularly unique case. This involvement made it less successful than other nations, like 
Yemen, which did not require such intervention. Democratic institutions remain unstable, 
but at least they exist, which is more than can be said for Syria and Bahrain.  
Bahrain was not successful in its response. The national response to the protests 
was poor. The regime remains in tact and elections have not been held. There has been no 
improvement in respect for human rights and the military took violent action against 
protestors, resulting in a death toll of approximately 100 people. Overall, Bahrain has 
been less successful than Libya because not even the seeds of democracy have been 
planted, but has been more successful than Syria because although the military was 
involved, the death toll remained low and the conflict did not escalate into civil war.  
Syria has been the least successful of all nations studied in its response to the 
protests. The Assad regime remains in tact and implemented the “military solution,” 
which involved brutally attacking protestors in an attempt to quell them. This solution 
was ineffective however, and has mired the nation in a bloody civil war that continues to 
  102 
rage on. As such, Syria is the most unsuccessful Arab Spring nation studied here in its 
response to the protests.  
The above findings are consistent with they proposed hypothesis, then. From this, 
it might be possible to surmise that Western assistance has at least been helpful in helping 
a country respond positively to the Arab Spring crisis as measured by U.S. 
democratization goals, even if it helped to do this indirectly.  
These results are important because they provide a new perspective on what 
successful aid means. They call into question at least some of the existing literature on 
the ineffectiveness of foreign aid and supports the literature that argues that foreign aid 
has been successful in helping countries to democratize. From these cases, it would 
appear that aid can facilitate positive change, albeit indirectly. It is important to keep in 
mind that these results imply only that Western assistance helped to lay the groundwork 
for a response that included a shift toward democracy. They do not imply that more 
Western assistance necessarily facilitated only a shift toward democracy, nor do they 
imply that those countries that were successful in their responses were successful in every 
single aspect of the dependent variable.   
Limitations Revisited 
As mentioned in the beginning, I was unable to resolve the endogeneity problem 
because I conducted a case study analysis. Future research on the Arab Spring, and on 
democracy aid more generally, should employ a multivariate analysis (like Savun and 
Finkel do) to control for possible confounding variables. It might then be possible to 
conclude whether it was the aid itself that helped nations democratize or whether it was 
some other underlying factor related to the nation itself. Future research on democracy 
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aid going to Arab Spring countries should also use process-tracing so as to gain a deeper 
understanding of where aid was successful. It will also provide a more detailed account 
of democracy aid and what, in particular, this aid helped with. For example, tracing 
democracy aid to a certain civil society group, and from there, to particular societal 
leaders, would allow one to understand the exact route of the aid and see the direct effect.  
Finally, a follow-up study should be conducted in the coming years. The Arab 
Spring still continues in some nations and as such, it is incredibly difficult to come to any 
certain conclusion. Things change in each nation on a daily basis, and so a year from 
now, the conclusions set forth in this paper may no longer apply. Indeed, since the start of 
this research, new reports detailing incidents in Morocco and other Arab nations have 
been published and have the potential to conflict with the conclusion set forth here.
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Conclusion 
Foreign aid is a topic that has been explored extensively, in which scholars have 
argued both in favor of and against the effectiveness of foreign aid. Some believe that 
foreign aid increases corruption of political leaders and creates dependent countries, 
while others believe that foreign aid actually strengthens nations’ infrastructure and helps 
them to avoid internal conflict. A few have looked specifically at the relationship 
between foreign aid and democratization, although the literature on this particular subject 
remains small. Fortunately, the recent events in the Arab region have allowed for a more 
in-depth examination of the effectiveness of democracy assistance in transitioning 
countries. 
It is clear from this research that there is some correlation between Western 
democracy assistance and the way in which a nation responded to the Arab Spring 
protests. I looked at eight nations, in particular, four that received a significant amount of 
Western democracy assistance (Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco) in the past decade 
and four that did not (Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain), and found that those that 
received a significant amount of democracy assistance responded more positively to the 
protests and were more successful in their transitions to democracy. Generally, these 
findings support those scholars that posit that foreign aid is effective, and further, bolster 
arguments that democracy assistance can help nations avoid domestic strife. This study, 
in particular, attempted to look at development aid in a more specific light and provide a 
unique definition of success, thus adding to the literature in a more focused manner.   
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As mentioned earlier, it is important to note that the Arab Spring continues in 
some nations and the ultimate results have yet to be seen. Although this is the case, it is 
still possible to see that those nations that received significantly less foreign aid than 
other nations have not responded well to the protests. Indeed, Syria and Bahrain (both of 
which received only a small amount of assistance) remain trapped in civil war and no 
change has resulted from the protests.  
These results open the door for further research into the topic of democracy aid 
and how effective it can actually be. They demonstrate that there is, in fact, some merit in 
democracy aid and that it can be helpful for those countries attempting to transition to 
democracy. This study, in addition to Savun’s and Finkel’s, demonstrates that democracy 
aid can help nations maintain order and take positive steps in the direction of democracy. 
However, more research must be conducted to state this with certainty. Either way, the 
study was beneficial in looking at foreign aid from a different perspective and was able to 
at least establish a correlation between Western democracy assistance and the responses 
of regimes to the Arab Spring protests, which, with future research, has the potential to 
become generalizable to a variety of democratizing nations.  
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Appendix 1 
 
*Foreign aid received as a percentage of GDP; all statistics from OECD data 
 
 
*Total foreign aid received; total aid allocated to government and civil society sector; all stats from OECD 
 
 
 
 
 GDP Aid received as % of GDP Gov’t & Civil Society Aid 
as % of GDP 
Tunisia $45.86 billion 11% 0.1% 
Egypt $229.53 billion 5.4% 0.15% 
Morocco $100.2 billion 8.7% 0.2% 
Jordan $28.84 billion 22% 1.7% 
Yemen $33.76 billion 6.2% 0.06% 
Libya $62.36 billion 0.97% 0.09% 
Bahrain $22.95 billion .01% No stats available 
Syria $59.15 billion 2.2% .07% 
 Aid Received in Total Aid Allocated to Gov’t & Civil Society Sector 
Tunisia $5 billion $50.3 million 
Egypt $12.5 billion $458.8 million 
Morocco $8.7 billion $250 million 
Jordan $6.57 billion $779 million 
Yemen $2.25 billion $200 million 
Libya $606 million $61.7 million 
Bahrain ~$79 million No stats available 
Syria $1.3 billion $42 million 
